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COMMENTS

A Right to Talk Dirty?: Academic
Freedom Values and Sexual Harassment in
the University Classroom
AMY H.

CANDIDO

t

"For many, [the university's] principal distinguishing characteristic is
unfettered expressive freedom... the one place that embraces, heart and
soul, John Stuart Mill's wide-open marketplace. For others, however, . . .
'a community of scholarship' seems more apt, with emphasis on the word
'community.' The university [embodies] equality, civility, tolerance, and
respect for human dignity; a place where the contemplative and rational
faculties of man should triumph over blind passion and prejudice. These
two images live side by side on campus. " '
Public universities today are becoming increasingly diverse while remaining
committed both to academic freedom and equality. In theory at least, academic
freedom and equality are compatible values that support a vision of the university as a community of scholars committed to the pursuit of truth, the
ideals of democracy, and autonomous self-fulfillment. In practice, however,
academic freedom and equality often appear to conflict when universities seek
to limit classroom speech in order to create a hospitable learning environment
for women. Attempts to prohibit hostile environment sexual harassment
perpetrated in the university classroom highlight the educational and societal
need to accommodate both academic freedom and equality. We should neither
allow professors to invoke academic freedom to avoid the consequences of
discrimination against women in the classroom, nor allow highly constrictive
regulation of classroom speech in the name of nondiscrimination to destroy the
important goals of academic freedom. So far, an effective compromise has been
elusive.

t. Amy H. Candido received her A.B. from Dartmouth College in 1994 and her J.D.
•'from The University of Chicago in 1997.
1. Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University,
53 L & Contemp Probs 195, 216-17 (Summer 1990).
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When academic freedom has been challenged by hostile environment sexual
harassment regulation of the classroom speech of university professors, the
courts have failed to accommodate properly both the values of academic
freedom and nondiscrimination. The courts' analysis has suffered from both an
overly narrow conception of academic freedom and a misguided reliance on
judicial precedents that reflect inapposite concerns.
Part I of this Comment examines the development and justifications for the
courts' recognition of academic freedom as deserving of special protection
under the First Amendment, concluding that apparent conflicts between
academic freedom and equality must be reconciled by adopting the resolution
that best preserves and fosters autonomy. Part II reviews the current judicial
treatment of classroom speech and argues that cases concerning the government's limited rights to restrict the workplace speech of government employees
and cases concerning the First Amendment rights of secondary school children
should not be relied upon in cases concerning the classroom speech of state
university professors because these cases fail to embrace a properly robust
vision of academic freedom. With this background, Part III attempts to clarify
the complex set of rights at stake when professors' speech creates a hostile
environment in the classroom and addresses two recent cases where the
classroom speech of university professors has allegedly created a sexually
hostile educational environment. Then, in Part IV, the Comment will draw
upon the autonomy-based understanding of academic freedom developed in
Part I and the cautionary tales revealed in Part II to suggest an approach to
these cases that will better accommodate and respect both academic freedom
and equality.
I. Academic Freedom: A Special Concern of the First Amendment
In 1940, the American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") and
the Association of American Colleges ("AAC") issued their Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure:
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and
not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for
truth and its free exposition. Academic freedom is essential to these
purposes . . . Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for

the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student
to freedom in learning.'
While not legal doctrine, this statement is widely observed in American higher
education through its adoption into bylaws, faculty contracts, and collective

2. American Association of University Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure, in Louis Joughin, ed, Academic Freedom and Tenure 34
(Wisconsin 1969).
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bargaining agreements. At the same time, the First Amendment protects the
freedom of expression universally, and its protections are mandatory and
enforceable in every court of the United States.3
Yet, despite the dissimilar grounding of the First Amendment and the 1940
AAUP and AAC Statement, their case law has often intersected. In fact,
although academic freedom may embrace broader protections than the First
Amendment in the university context, 4 academic freedom remained purely
"soft" law constitutionally until incorporated into the Supreme Court's First
Amendment "hard" law analysis! Since then, academic freedom's vitality and
influence have continued to grow.6

3. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." US Const, Amend .
While not directly addressed to the states, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment applies to the state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fiske
v Kansas, 274 US 380 (1927). Neither Amendment applies to private entities not operating

as agents of the state. As a result, private universities are bound by the First Amendment
only through state law provisions that may parallel the First Amendment or principles of
contract law applied to university student or faculty handbooks, etc. To simplify this Comment, I will only focus on public universities. While most higher education in the United
States is private, I believe that the principles developed in this Comment, focusing on
public universities, should have similar moral, if not legal, applicability in private universities.
4. "Free speech is a moral right---and in America a legal right, as well-for everyone.

But it doesn't provide for everyone what academic freedom provides for scholars ....
Free speech, at its core, is the right not to be altogether prevented from saying something,
not the right to continue to be supported and aided while saying it by those who think
it false or undesirable. In that respect, academic freedom, which does require certain institutions to support and help people no matter what they write or say or teach, is stronger
than the more general right of free speech. In other respects, however, it is less clearly a
right, because no one is morally entitled to the status which brings that extra protection."

Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Interpretationof Academic Freedom, in Louis Menand,
ed, The Future of Academic Freedom 184 (Chicago 1996).
5. See Keyisbian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 603 (1967); see also, William W.

Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the
United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 L & Contemp Probs 79, 79-81
(Summer 1990). The extent to which academic freedom has become "hard" law constitutionally is unclear, and academic freedom has legal force only insofar as it has been incorporated into the Supreme Court's First Amendment doctrine or made binding contractually.
6. Not everyone agrees with this assessment, however. J. Peter Byrne takes a much
narrower view of the proper degree to which academic freedom should be
constitutionalized. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of

the First Amendment", 99 Yale L J 251 (1989). Byrne distinguishes between "'academic
freedom'" referring to "the liberties claimed by professors through professional channels
against administrative or political interference with research, teaching, and governance," id

at 255, and "'constitutional academic freedom'" which insulates the university as an
institution "in core academic affairs from interference by the state." Id. Constitutional academic freedom, he argues, should be limited to ensuring that academic institutions may
freely determine "'on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
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Although the boundaries of the Supreme Court's academic freedom
doctrine remain uncharted, and the text of the First Amendment does not
mention academic freedom, courts have been clear that academic freedom is
"entitled to some measure of constitutional protection." 7 In the landmark case
Keyishian v Board of Regents, the Supreme Court explicitly linked academic

freedom to the First Amendment, endorsing academic freedom as "of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned."' The Court
launched academic freedom as "a special concern of the First Amendment."9
The First Amendment's embodiment of academic freedom, according to the
Court, does "not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 'The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools.'"'"
A. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS A FIRST
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, even harmful speech.
Three primary philosophical arguments have been advanced to explain this
special protection: the search for truth," the argument from democracy," and
the argument from autonomy. 3 In contrast, while courts and commentators
be taught, and who may be admitted to study.'" Id at 339, quoting Sweezy v New
Hampshire, 354 US 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter concurring). According to Byrne, courts
that have extended constitutional academic freedom to professors and students have gone
too far, thereby diluting the university's core academic freedom by expanding the judiciary's interference into areas that should be controlled by the university.
While Byrne seems correct when he explains that his four constitutional academic
freedoms belonging to the university are important because they produce "that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation," id at 339-40, quoting
Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter concurring), I think
Byrne incorrectly underemphasizes the role that the academic freedoms possessed by
professors and students play in fostering this atmosphere. Therefore, this Comment will
argue that constitutional academic freedom must include a spectrum of rights, including
those of professors, students, and the university.
If academic freedom, as it regards the rights of professors and students in the
university classroom, was left to "professional channels," the university's ability to regulate
sexual harassment in the classroom would likely be unchecked and the values served by
academic freedom, whether professional or constitutional, and the promotion of an
atmosphere "conducive to speculation, experimentation and creation" would suffer
greatly.
7. Cooper v Ross, 472 F Supp 802, 812 (E D Ark 1979).
8. 385 US 589, 603 (1967) (finding plan to bar appointment or retention of
subversive employees as public school faculty violates First Amendment).
9. Id.
10. Id, citing Sbelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 488 (1960).
11. See, for example, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 44 (Hackett 1978). This is discussed in greater detail in Part I.A.1.
12. See, for example, Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 S Ct Rev 245, 252 (1961); Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free
Speech (Free Press 1993). This is discussed in greater detail in Part I.A.2.
13. See, for example, David A.J. Richards, Rights and Autonomy, 92 Ethics 3, 4 (Oct
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refer to academic freedom as a special subset of the First Amendment, the
theoretical justification for academic freedom's claim to constitutional protection
has received little attention. 14 Typically, if any justifications are offered, academic freedom is defended for its contribution to the search for truth and its contribution to democracy. Courts and commentators have generally ignored academic
freedom's vital contribution to the pursuit of individual autonomy. Yet, in order
to comprehend fully what we lose when we allow states and universities to
restrict academic freedom, academic freedom must be recognized for its ability
to foster truth, democracy and individual autonomy. To properly gauge when
academic freedom may be compromised out of deference to other rights or
values, such as the equality interests infringed by sexual harassment in the
classroom, the strongest case for the protection of academic freedom in our
university classrooms must be advanced so that a proper balance may be struck.
1. The Marketplace of Ideas and The Search for Truth
A dominant argument for free speech developed out of the conviction that
truth was an inherent good and would prevail in an open fight with falsity or
evil. As the preeminent advocate for free speech as a means to truth, John Stuart
Mill warned against the dangers of suppression, even when practiced with the
best intentions. According to Mill, "if any opinion is compelled to silence, that
opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility."' 5 Even "falsehoods" should not be restricted because such repression presumes we are infallible-which is clearly untenable in
light of the preponderance of historical evidence pointing to egregious errors,
such as the belief that the world is flat. Under a regime of suppression, any
confidence in our ability to know the truth absolutely is even more ridiculous
because confidence in the truthfulness of a belief should only come from a full
consideration of all points of view."
In an environment of open discussion where all views are represented and
advocated, we stand a much greater chance of ever formulating the whole truth
than if only one view is allowed a voice. An unpopular opinion may be needed
to supply a vital part of the "truth." Moreover, even if the established belief is
the "whole truth," Mill argues that, unless it is "vigorously and earnestly
contested," the belief will be held without passion because there will be no sense
of the basis of its truthfulness. Open debate in the unfettered marketplace of
ideas gives truth its strength. When truth is simply asserted, it becomes lifeless
because we have no "heartfelt conviction from reason or personal experience" to

1981); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Penn L Rev 591 (1982). This

is discussed in greater detail in Part LA.3.
14. Louis Menand, ed, The Future of Academic Freedom (Chicago 1996) is a noted
exception.

15. Mill, On Liberty at 50 (cited in note 11).
16. Id at 19.
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support our beliefs. 7 On the other hand, when truth is openly challenged and
analyzed, ideas have life and power.
The argument from truth has also provided the primary justification for
judicial protection of academic freedom in American universities. In Keyishian v
Board of Regents, the Supreme Court relied on the Millian argument as a
rationale for constitutionalizing academic freedom." Assuming that "[t]he
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,'"' 9 the Court recognized that
limiting the effectiveness of classroom interchange limits the prospects for healthy
exercise of the First Amendment in the nation at large. Accordingly, the Court
maintained that our "Nation's future" depends upon education "through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.'" 2"
Thus, academic freedom represents deference to the university's vital role in
the development and preservation of truth and knowledge. Believing that the
search for truth is an evolutionary process through which truth is strengthened
and refined through its battle with falsehood, courts acknowledge the crucial
part universities play in this process.
Prior to Keyshian, in Sweezy v New Hampshire,2' the Supreme Court

stressed the value of education and academic freedom's role in its preservation.
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust....
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
and understanding; otherwise our civilizaevaluate, to gain new maturity
22
tion will stagnate and die.

In the Court's view, scholarship and academic pursuits exemplify the pursuit of
knowledge and, consequently, the search for truth. Moreover, the rigors of the
academic method further support the unique relevance of academic speech to the
pursuit of truth. "Truths" are more likely to be challenged in the university
setting than anywhere else. As a result, academic speech has a special claim to
First Amendment protection. J. Peter Byrne explains that the First Amendment
value of academic speech derives from "its commitment to truth (however
its richness of
partially understood by the discipline), its honesty and carefulness,
"2
meaning, its doctrinal freedom, and its invitation to criticism. 1
However, several factors mitigate against relying solely on the search for
truth as a guiding principle for academic-freedom jurisprudence. First, the search-

17. Id at 50.
18. 385 US 589, 602-03 (1967).
19. Id at 603 (citations omitted).
20. Id.
21. Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354 US 234 (1957) (holding that Attorney General's
questioning of college professor concerning the content of professor's lectures and his
knowledge of a particular political party and its adherents was an invasion of professor's
liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression).
22. Id at 250.
23. Byrne, 99 Yale L J at 259-60 (cited in note 6).

19971

Sexual Harassmentin the Classroom 91

for-truth justification for academic freedom has been challenged by scholars who
challenge the basic notion of any objective "truth." Relativists, subjectivists, neoPragmatists, postmodernists and others argue that "there is no such thing as
truth, but only interest; that norms of objectivity are pernicious; that knowledge
is political."24
Second, Ronald Dworkin notes the search for truth may not sufficiently
explain the "emotional power" that resonates with academic freedomY A
complete justification for academic freedom must explain that it is more than
"some speculative loss of knowledge, at the margin of research" 2 that academic
freedom protects. Otherwise, academic freedom will appear to be simply a
meaningless roadblock in the quest "to protect people who have been victims of
great social injustice from further insult, or to make their opportunity to help
themselves and other members of their race or gender more genuine and effective. " '
2. The Argument From Democracy
American democracy, conceived of as limited government subordinate to the
liberty of the individual, requires free speech to function successfully. According
to Alexander Meildejohn, "[tihe freedom that the First Amendment protects...
is the presence of self-government."2' As citizens in a democracy, we must
assert our sovereign power through the vote and through our ability to check or
censure public officials when we disapprove of their actions.'
These actions, to be an effective and legitimate representation of an individual's interests, must be informed. Meildejohn argues, for example, that meaningful
self-government exists only insofar as voters acquire "the intelligence, integrity,
sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting
a ballot is assumed to express." 0 A voter acquires these capacities through free
and open dialogue about all issues of "governing importance""1 as well as2
3
freedom of education, in philosophy, science, literature and the arts.
Meiklejohn highlighted education's ability to increase knowledge, intelligence,
and sensitivity to important values which enhance the capacity for sane and
objective judgment which, he argues, a vote should express.3 3

24. Cass R. Sunstein, Academic Freedom and Law: Liberalism, Speech Codes, and
Related Problems, in Louis Menand, ed, The Future of Academic Freedom 115 (Chicago
1996). See also Dworkin, New Interpretation at 183 (cited in note 4).
25. Dworkin, New Interpretation at 187 (cited in note 4).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Meiklejohn, 1961 S Ct Rev at 252 (cited in note 12).
29. Id at 257 ("Though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense, govern them. Over our
governing, they have no power. Over their governing, we have sovereign power.").
30. Id at 255.
31. Id at 262.

32. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 7
(Harper & Brothers 1948).
33. Id at 106.
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Recognizing academic freedom as a concern of the First Amendment, the
courts have also drawn upon the idea that education, much like free speech,
plays an important role in preserving democracy. First, as Meiklejohn explained,
a true vote must be informed. 4 The university contributes to the information
pool through its central role in the marketplace of ideas. By its very nature, the
academic project fuels the inquiry and debate that produce and refine ideas,
which ultimately are the intellectual and cultural fodder for voters both inside
and outside the university community. Second, to be conducive to democracy,
votes must be the product of rational judgment."5 The university, by teaching
students to think and weigh arguments, supports this process by creating voters
capable of exercising independent judgment.
In Sweezy, the Court gave the academic process's contribution to democracy
great deference, cautioning that "the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth" must not be underestimated."' Finding
the "essentiality" of academic freedom "almost self-evident," the Court insisted
that "[tlo impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges
and universities would imperil the future of our Nation."" Similarly, courts
have "on numerous occasions emphasized that the right to teach, to inquire, to
evaluate and to study is fundamental to a democratic society."" Finally, the
education of young citizens demands "scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual," like free speech in academic discourse, "if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes. " "
While the proliferation of ideas that education fosters benefits the deliberative process which is central to democracy, some critics caution that we should
not value education and protect academic freedom out of a belief that education
itself creates democracy. A democracy-based justification of academic freedom
may push education into the job of inculcating democratic values.4" At least at
the university level, highlighting academic freedom's contribution to democracy

34. Meiklejohn, 1961 S Ct Rev at 255 (cited in note 12).
35. Id.
36. Sweezy, 354 US at 250.
37. Id.
38. Parducci v Rutland, 316 F Supp 352, 355 (M D Ala 1970) (dismissal of high
school teacher who assigned a Kurt Vonnegut short story that administrators asserted was
obscene and condoned the killing of elderly and free sex was an unconstitutional invasion
of the teacher's First Amendment right to academic freedom).
39. W Virginia Bd of Educ v Barnette, 319 US 624, 637 (1943).
40. See, for example, Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton 1987) (arguing
that education should instill in children a respect for toleration, equality, and liberal
democracy).
This version of the democracy based justification for academic freedom demands
academic freedom at all levels of education, especially elementary and secondary schools.
Yet, as the truth and autonomy arguments suggest, academic freedom's primary values are
most exemplified and protected in higher education, where the inculcation of cultural or
national values is incompatible with the core elements of the academic project.
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may destroy the essence of education--critical intellectualism.41 According to
Edward Said, the university's primary reason for being must be intellectual, and
"the intellect must not be coercively held in thrall to the authority of the national
identity."42 Academic freedom may produce democracy as a by-product because
it encourages informed voting, but should not be relied upon to create citizens
that value democracy.
3. The Argument From Autonomy
In his defense of liberty, Mill also provides a crucial link between free speech
and individual autonomy. This link is found in the intimate relationship between
free expression and freedom of thought. According to Mill, human liberty
comprises "the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience
in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling, absolute freedom
of opinion and sentiment on all subjects."4 3 While free speech rights may appear to be different because they also concern the rights of other people, the
freedom of thought and free speech are intimately related, if not "practically
inseparable." 44
Any suppression is evil, apart from any practical concerns of what is being
censored, because it hinders the exercise of free thought, which thereby stunts the
exercise of personal autonomy. For the same reasons that censorship should not
be used to save the marketplace of ideas from falsehood, liberty requires that individuals be able to draw upon both truth and falsehood in developing their own
unique set of opinions and beliefs. Ultimately, according to Mill, human liberty
"requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to suit our
own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow." 45
Mill's vision of liberty-the full development of thought and judgment in an
"atmosphere of freedom4"--parallels modem conceptions of individual autonomy. Freedom of thought and consciousness contribute to autonomy by fostering
the free will that enables individuals to evaluate their lives. Individuals can then
make free and informed choices not to be bound to their immediate present
desires, but to give weight to their desires and projects over time. As Joseph Raz
explains, "the ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions
throughout their lives." 47 Such personal autonomy is not simply a moral ideal,
41. "For in its essence the intellectual life ... is about the freedom to be critical:
criticism is intellectual life and, while the academic precinct contains a great deal in it, its
spirit is intellectual and critical, and neither reverential nor patriotic." Edward W. Said,

Identity, Authority, and Freedom: The Potentate and the Traveler, in Louis Menand, ed,
The Future of Academic Freedom 223 (Chicago 1996).
42. Id.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Mill, On Liberty at 11 (cited in note 11).
Id at 12.
Id.
Id at 50.

47. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 369 (Clarendon 1986). See also Gerald
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but is "a right that every responsible person has, a right to make certain deci4
sions for himself or herself without undue interference from others."
According to Raz, autonomy requires three distinct components: appropriate
mental abilities, an adequate range of options, and independence. 49 Since academic freedom is vital to the creation and preservation of all three of these
conditions, academic freedom should be guarded under the auspices of personal
autonomy. Autonomy, then, demands freedom of speech and academic freedom
that "protect not a thought, but the process of thinking."
Academic freedom promotes the first component of autonomy by creating
the learning environment in which individuals can best develop the mental
capacities that will enable them to exercise fully their autonomy. As Raz explains,
[i]f a person is to be maker or author of his own life then he must have the
mental abilities to form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind, and plan
their execution. These include minimum rationality, the ability to comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental faculties necessary
to plan actions, etc. s0
Education, at all levels, nurtures these basic skills"' and provides "a general
atmosphere of discussion" which is crucial to the development of the capacity to

Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy 20 (Cambridge 1988) ("autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order
preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change
these in light of higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons
define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for
the kind of person they are.").
48. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Self-Respect 47-48 (Cambridge 1991) ("To say
that a person is autonomous, in this view, is not to describe the person (e.g., as mature,
reflective, or independent); it is to grant the person a right to control certain matters for
himself or herself.").
49. Raz, The Morality of Freedom at 372 (cited in note 47). See also Sunstein,
Academic Freedom and Law at 94 (cited in note 24). The conditions Sunstein identifies
as necessary to a deliberative democracy are also strikingly similar to Raz's three prerequisites to the exercise of personal autonomy: "Those conditions include adequate information; a norm of political equality, in which arguments matter but power and authority do
not; an absence of strategic manipulation of information, perspective, processes, or
outcomes in general; and a broad public orientation toward reaching right answers rather
than serving self-interest, narrowly defined."
50. Raz, The Morality of Freedom at 372-73 (cited in note 47).
51. See Sunstein, Academic Freedom and Law at 116 (cited in note 24) ("mhe
purpose of liberal education is associated with the production of certain valuable human
characteristics, including a capacity for activity, the ability to develop, pursue, and evaluate
a plan of life, and much more.").
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be a good decision-maker.5 " By exposing individuals to the full breadth of the
marketplace of ideas and socializing them into the human marketplace, higher
education especially promotes autonomy by giving individuals a wellspring of
criteria for rational choice and conceptual schemes for grasping relevant issues. 3 According to one court, the Constitution embraces academic freedom
because of its capacity
to foster open minds, creative imaginations, and adventurous spirits. Our
national belief is that the heterodox as well as the orthodox are a source of
individual and social growth.... Our faith is that the.., freedom to
choose among options... will increase [one's] intellectual vitality and ]
moral strength. 4
A student's ability to maximize his or her capacity for autonomous decisionmaking is directly related to the quality of teaching to which he or she is exposed. A good teacher serves as a role model for the development of student
autonomy by demonstrating how one evaluates and adapts others' ideas in light
of changing times and one's own inclinations and desires. In Sbelton v Tucker,"5
the Supreme Court recognized that good teaching depends upon the academic
freedom and autonomy of teachers. Any encroachment upon the academic
freedom of teachers, according to the Court, "'has an unmistakable tendency to
chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate
and practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations,'" 6 which
in turn limits teachers' abilities to provide and role model the skills required for
student autonomy.
A good teacher's influence can also extend beyond the classroom. The
teacher who enjoys academic freedom is "important symbolically, because in a
free academy the example and virtues of ethical individualism are so patently on
display."s' As emphasized by Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in Sweezy

52. RLS. Peters, Freedom and the Development of the Free Man, in James F. Doyle, ed,
Educational Judgments: Papers in the Philosophy of Education 134-35 (Routledge &
Kegan Paul 1973) (exploring how the institutions and practices of formal education foster
the development of autonomy).
53. See S.L Benn, Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person, LXXVI Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109, 126 (Jan 12, 1976). In elementary and secondary
education, the scope of ideas presented will be necessarily limited by the intellectual and
emotional development of the students and the tailoring of education to create good citizens.
54. Mailloux v Kiley, 323 F Supp 1387, 1391 (D Mass 1971) aff'd, 448 F2d 1242
(1st Cir 1971).
55. Sbelton v Tucker, 364 US 479 (1960).
56. Id at 487, quoting Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183, 195 (concurring opinion)
(holding requirement that teachers file affidavit listing organizational affiliations was
unconstitutional).
57. Dworkin, New Interpretation at 189-90 (cited in note 4). "A culture of independence values learning 'for its own sake' because such learning is also, in that way, for
that culture's sake as well." Id at 190.
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v New Hampshire, the university operates for the good of all people by serving
as a model for critical inquiry and by stimulating those outside the university to
reflect upon the problems of the day."8
The liberal studies focus of many modern universities especially fosters
autonomy by teaching "students how to take comfort in the clash of opposing
views by developing an individual perspective founded on a just appreciation of
facts." 9 Academic freedom creates students and teachers who are more autonomous, whose free evaluation of ideas will contribute to the search for truth, and
whose exercise of rational thought will help preserve democracy.
The second prerequisite to autonomy is the availability of an adequate range
of options from which an individual can choose.6" To be adequate, such options
must entail both the actual availability of "a large number of greatly differing
pursuits among which individuals are free to choose," 6 and a plethora of ideas
and arguments which individuals may consider in forming their values and their
reasons for making various choices. Assuming that autonomy as a good should
usually embrace some notion of rationality or, at least, authentic purposefulness,
the coherence of isolated autonomous decisions into a life plan also requires a
healthy marketplace of ideas."2 "We act on a belief rationally only if we know

58. 354 US 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter concurring). According to Frankfurter, in
order to preserve this function of the university as the embodiment of a Millian ideal of
"free inquiry," academic freedom "'implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject
traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of
an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its
scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but
to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself....

It is the business of a

university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment
and creation.'" Id.
59. Byrne, 99 Yale L J at 337 (cited in note 6).
60. Raz, The Morality of Freedom at 372-73 (cited in note 47).
61. Id at 381.
62. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 69 (Cambridge 1982)
("If the final decision [in all life choices] is properly for the individual, then that individual's decision ought to be as informed and intelligent as possible.").
This argument also has roots in the justification for free speech based on its
contribution to democracy. Martin Redish suggests that having recognized the value of free
speech to democracy, the benefits of free speech cannot logically end with the production
of informed political decisions, since, at least in his view, political democracy is "merely
a means to" or an outgrowth of personal autonomy. Redish, 130 U Penn L Rev at 601
(cited in note 13). Redish explains: "Their logic, however, leaves us with an untenable
situation: when an individual only has an indirect say in governing his life, either by
voting on particular questions or by selecting governing agents who will make the
decisions, he has a right to information that will enable him to exercise his power more
effectively; but when the individual has full and total authority to make the very same
decisions, his right to the information mysteriously vanishes. Reason would seem to
dictate, however, that the individual has at least as great a need for a free flow of
information and opinion related to life-affecting decisions that he makes solely for himself. . . .Thus, the first amendment guarantee of free expression is designed to play an
important role in the exercise of that decisionmaking power at either level." Id at 607.
Cass Sunstein's conception of our form of democracy as a deliberative democracy
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it to be the 'best' belief available, and we know a belief to be the best only if we
have heard all the others."63 Therefore, respect for personal autonomy demands
that the free flow of information relevant to autonomous decision-making"
must not be manipulated or restricted. 5
Academic freedom, through its widely-recognized subsidization of the
marketplace of ideas," is crucial to the maintenance of options, both informational and practical. Unlike a Millian marketplace of ideas, the university
marketplace is valuable not for its contribution to truth or the advancement of
knowledge, but for its ability to provide the widest possible range of ideas to the
process of making judgments about motivations and values. Each autonomous
person can evaluate ideas in a free marketplace and arrive at a personal "truth"
with his or her beliefs, preferences, and goals independently conceived absent the
perverse effects of manipulation or coercion. Any suppression, even the suppression of an undeniable falsehood, the removal of which would not hinder the
search for truth, encroaches the ultimate process of individual choice that allows
an individual to call his beliefs his own. 7

also recognizes the value of such deliberation to individual autonomy. In a deliberative
democracy, he argues, politics "is designed to have an important deliberative feature, in
which new information and perspectives influence social judgments about possible courses
of action. Through exposure to such information and perspectives, both collective and
individual decisions can be shaped and improved." Sunstein, Academic Freedom and Law
at 94 (cited in note 24). See also Schauer, Free Speech at 41 ("as we shift from a sterile
notion of democracy as majority rule to democracy as equal participation, free access to
information becomes more a matter of respect for individual dignity, individual choice, and
equal treatment of all individuals, and less an idea grounded in notions of sovereignty").
63. Schauer, Free Speech, at 24 (cited in note 62). "We achieve rational confidence in
our views, confidence sufficient to justify action, in most instances by comparing those
views to others already evaluated. We can sensibly prefer one view to others only by
knowing what the others are." Id.
64. "Because individuals constantly make life-affecting decisions-from the significant
to the trivial--each day of their lives, there is probably no expression of opinion or information that would not potentially affect some such decision at some point in time.
Therefore, the marketplace-of-ideas concept as a protector of all such expression makes
perfect sense." Redish, 130 U Penn L Rev at 618 (cited in note 13).
65. This use of the marketplace of ideas differs from the marketplace of ideas as a
means to truth. Here, ideas have value and should be protected not as a means to
achieving truth, but as a means of ensuring that individuals can decide on reasons for
acting or pursue a life plan free from the coercive influence of others. To be fully autonomous, individuals must be free to give meaning to their own lives, even basing their decisions on so-called "false" beliefs or ideas. On the other hand, in the pursuit of truth,
"false" beliefs and ideas are only protected out of a sense of caution and human fallibility, etc., as explained in Part LA.1.
66. See Part I.A.1.
67. "On this view, government cannot insult the moral autonomy of its citizens by
stopping them from hearing what other people have to say-especially if the reason that
the government acts is its fear that citizens will be influenced or persuaded by what is
said. This is a unique invasion into each individual's moral and deliberative capacities.... these considerations bear directly on the subject of academic freedom." Sunstein,
Academic Freedom and Law at 96 (cited in note 24).
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Personal autonomy thus demands that we do not limit the exercise of
academic freedom in university classrooms.6" Implicitly recognizing a domain of
individual autonomy, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that restrictions of
academic freedom "invade[] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control." 69 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's endorsement of the university as
the paradigmatic marketplace of ideas would be meaningless unless the critical
spirit upon which autonomy depends and which academic freedom fosters is
allowed to flourish.
Raz's third condition necessary for autonomy, requiring that an individual's
"choice [be] free from coercion and manipulation by others," 70 reiterates the
Court's statement in Barnette that the autonomous individual has "a right to
receive information and, more importantly, a right to be free from governmental
intrusion into the ultimate process of individual choice." 7 The independence
required for autonomy rests upon an understanding of individual liberty that
defines individuals as beings separate from the state. Justice Frankfurter regarded
autonomy, the "inviolate character of the individual," as requiring "protect[ion]
to the largest possible extent in [our] thoughts and in [our] beliefs as the citadel
of [the] person. " '
By allowing ideas to flourish untainted by suppression, academic freedom
provides the raw materials for self-critical evaluation-ideas and beliefs that have
been determined, not by the authoritarian will of others, but by arguments and
evidence which have been rationally examined and assented to.73 Academic
freedom is integral to "a culture of independence" 74 in which autonomy flourishes.7' Academic freedom, by safeguarding the independence of our educational
institutions, plays a special part in promoting this culture of independence and

68. Personal autonomy may similarly demand the free exercise of academic freedom in
elementary and secondary education; but, in that context, the intellectual and emotional
immaturity of students may mandate some limits on academic freedom. Personal autonomy
also requires the free flow of information in society at large, but this interest is generally
protected by the First Amendment.
69. Barnette, 319 US at 642 (holding that, under the First Amendment, a student in
a public school cannot be compelled to salute the flag).
70. Raz, The Morality of Freedom at 372-73 (cited in note 47). See also Hill, Autonomy at 48 (cited in note 48) ("[Autonomy] is a right to make otherwise morally permissible decisions about matters deeply affecting one's own life without interference by
controlling threats and bribes, manipulations, and willful distortion of relevant information.").
71. Barnette, 319 US at 642.
72. American Communications Ass'n, CIO v Douds, 339 US 382, 421 (1950)
(Frankfurter concurring).
73. Richards, 92 Ethics at 3, 11 (cited in note 13).
74. Dworkin, New Interpretation at 189 (cited in note 4).
75. See also, Raz, The Morality of Freedom at 377-78 (cited in note 47). "Manipulation [of ideas and their expression] . . . perverts the way that person reaches decisions,
forms preferences or adopts goals," consequently subverting "the will of one person to
that of another. That violates his independence and is inconsistent with autonomy."
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defending it against "a culture of conformity."' According to Ronald Dworkin,
educational institutions are "pivotal, first, because they can so easily become
engines of conformity, as every totalitarian regime has realized, and, second,
because they can provide important encouragement and skills for a life of
personal conviction."' The type of education created by an environment of
academic freedom, perhaps more so than any other force in society, teaches its
students, and as a result society at large," "the importance and depth of an
allegiance to personal rather than collective truth."79 Such a commitment to
personal "truth" fuels the engine of autonomous decision-making.
On the other hand, when the freedom of teachers or students to speak,
write, research or teach is restricted, whether for malevolent or benevolent
reasons,80 autonomy suffers."1 The personal autonomy of all whose "learning
is corrupted" by such restrictions is endangered. 2 Society also is damaged, not
only through the loss of the symbolic value of the scholar, but through the direct
offense to the general culture of independence.
B. LOOKING TO AUTONOMY TO RESOLVE APPARENT CoNFLIrS BETWEEN
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND EQUAITY
In any comprehensive attempt to respect individual autonomy, conflict
between the personal autonomy of individuals is inevitable given the necessity of
making available various and often contradictory ideas, attitudes, and life pursuits. 3 As a result, according to Raz, "there is a need to curb people's actions
and their attitudes in those conflicts by principles of toleration," 4 which demand that we tolerate the distasteful or even offensive actions and attitudes of
others up until the point at which those actions and attitudes cause harm,
76. Dworkin, New Interpretation at 189-90 (cited in note 4).
77. Id at 189.
78. "[A]cademic freedom plays an important ethical role not just in the lives of the
few people it protects, but in the life of the community more generally. It is an important,
structural part of the culture of independence that we need in order to ... each make
up our own mind, as a matter of felt personal conviction, about what a successful life for
us would be." Id at 187.
79. Id at 189.
80. As Thomas Hill maintains, one harms others' autonomy by concealing or distorting
information relevant to their life-affecting choices, "even if one's aim is not primarily to
influence their choices," simply because they are deprived of the opportunity to make such
choices based upon the concealed or undistorted information. Hill, Autonomy at 48-49
(cited in note 48).
81. Individual autonomy, similarly advanced as a justification for the First Amendment
generally, also suffers when free speech outside the university is curtailed. While autonomy
is not specific to the university, the autonomy argument justifies academic freedom and
highlights its role in the larger culture of independence that the First Amendment protects.
82. Dworkin, New Interpretation at 190 (cited in note 4).
83. "[C]ompetitive value pluralism of the kind which is required by respect for
autonomy generates conflicts between people pursuing valuable but incompatible forms of
life." Raz, The Morality of Freedom at 407 (cited in note 47).
84. Id.

100

Roundtable

[4:85

narrowly defined as injury to autonomy. When harm is caused both by toleration
and suppression, the relative importance of these harms is to be judged "by the
degree of restriction of ...autonomy [they] represent[].""5

Thus, in situations in which academic freedom appears to conflict with
principles of nondiscrimination or equality, the proper resolution should seek to
maximize the personal autonomy of the individuals directly concerned and the
individuals in the larger community while keeping in mind that autonomy
depends upon certain mental capacities, an adequate range of options and
information, and independence. In order to maximize autonomy in such conflicts, the government may utilize coercion or manipulation solely to prevent
harm to autonomy.8 6
Although predominately a principle of toleration and non-interference, Raz's
harm principle appears to allow a significant amount of government intervention
of which we are inherently, and presumably rightly, suspicious. However, Raz
cautions that his account of autonomy and the government's role in promoting
it posits an ideal, benevolent, and almost omniscient government that may not
exist in reality. In our attempts to maximize autonomy, we need "constant
reminders that the fact that the state considers anything to be valuable or
valueless is no reason for anything. Only its being valuable or valueless is a
reason."87 Thus, despite harm to autonomy, there may be situations in which
we should not intervene because the remedy may cause more harm to autonomy
than the initial incident. If we have no reason to believe that "the government
will not judge such matters correctly then it has no authority to judge them at
all." 8
II. Missing the Point: Academic Freedom, University Classroom
Speech, and the Courts
The classroom speech of both university professors and students is a core
concern of academic freedom because it nurtures the mental skills of students,
contributes in a distinctive and indispensable way to the free flow of ideas, and
sustains the culture of independence essential to the exercise of personal autonomy both within the university and the larger society. Academic freedom is best
exemplified by the "robust and uninhibited exchange of ideas between the
individual professor and his students." 89 As a result, many courts recognize that
limitations on classroom speech raise important academic freedom concerns.

85. Id at 421.
86. See id at 416-20.
87. Id at 412.
88. Id.
89. Parate v Isibor, 868 F2d 821, 826 (6th Cir 1989) (university officials violated
professor's right to academic freedom when they ordered professor to change student's
grade). See also Parducci v Rutland, 316 F Supp 352, 355 (M D Ala 1970) ("the Court
[has] stressed the need to expose students to a robust exchange of ideas in the classroom").
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However, the exact scope of academic freedom's protection of classroom speech
is not well-defined.90 While the Supreme Court has clearly endorsed academic
freedom as an important First Amendment right, the Court has never directly
addressed the appropriate level of First Amendment protection for speech in the
university classroom. 91
To add to the confusion, what legal doctrine that does exist regarding
classroom speech in the university setting has developed out of the application of
two divergent and theoretically incomplete areas of case law. Some courts have
looked to the line of Supreme Court cases addressing the scope of secondary
school students' speech rights, as represented by Tinker v Des Moines School
District.2 Other courts have appropriated the Supreme Court's test for identifying the scope of First Amendment protection afforded to the out-of-class
speech of teachers as public employees, as articulated in Pickering v Board of
3 As a result, courts grappling with
Education."
academic freedom issues raised
by university classroom speech have produced inconsistent, and often unsatisfactory, results. Neither Tinker nor Pickering adequately preserves the important
academic freedom values jeopardized by limitations on classroom speech. Neither
line of analysis accounts for the importance of personal autonomy or the special
nature of university classroom speech. Although neither Tinker nor Pickering
should have ever been applied to university classroom speech, many courts, in
particular those courts addressing sexual harassment in the university class-

90. "While the Supreme Court has developed the Pickering balance for a teacher's
speech outside the classroom, no such balance or standard has been formulated by the
Court for speech inside the classroom. As a result lower courts have applied somewhat
varying standards." Mahoney v Hankin, 593 F Supp 1171, 1174 (SDNY 1984) (holding
tenured political science professor's complaint alleging that university threatened to retaliate
against him for discussing union activities on campus, part of his course curriculum and
his choice of pedagogical method for his course, stated a cause of action under the First
Amendment and academic freedom).
91. Not even the AAUP's statement on academic freedom is clear regarding the desirable level of protection for classroom speech. While maintaining that "[a]cademic
freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights of the
teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning," the AAUP guidelines do
not establish an absolute right to academic freedom. Rather, "the teacher is entitled to
freedom in the classroom discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce
into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject." American Association of University Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom and
Tenure (cited in note 2).
In the AAUP's 1915 Declaration of Principles, "the committee declared that 'restraints as to the matter or manner of (individual teacher's) utterances could not be
imposed by 'bodies not composed of members of the academic profession.' Therefore,
academic freedom, as the committee conceived it, would generally insulate individual
professors from interference both 'within' and 'without' the university, but would allow for
a peer-review system which would judge university professors solely on their academic
competence." Brian G. Brooks, Adequate Cause for Dismissal: The Missing Element in
Academic Freedom, 22 J Coll & Univ L 331, 339-340 (1995).
92. 393 US 503 (1969).
93. 391 US 563, 568 (1968).
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room, 4 have adopted Tinker or Pickering's analysis. As a result, this Comment
must examine Tinker and Pickering in order to explain how their logic has
deformed the analysis of university classroom sexual harassment and to suggest
a better approach.
A. TINKER V DES MOINES SCHOOL DISTRICT
In Tinker, the Supreme Court was confronted with a group of secondary
school students who wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War
and then were suspended for breaking a hastily fashioned school rule prohibiting
armbands. Finding that armbands constitute symbolic speech closely akin to pure
speech, the Court held that the armbands were protected speech under the First
Amendment because both students and teachers retain their First Amendment
rights at school."5 According to the Court, "[ijt can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." 6
Characterizing Tinker as involving "direct, primary First Amendment rights"
that do not "intrude[] upon the work of the schools or the rights of other
students," 97 the Court did not address the special values served by academic
freedom because it found that the academic project was unaffected. 9' Instead,
the Court analyzed this case as a straight-forward restriction of free speech. 9
Thus, unless school officials can show a "constitutionally valid reason[]" to
regulate
student speech, such speech is entitled to First Amendment protec0
tion."

In Tinker, the Court thought that the school officials overstated their claim
that the suspensions were necessary "to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools.""' Rather, in the Court's view, the school officials had no more than
an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance," 10 2 and the Court

94. See Silva v University of New Hampshire, 888 F Supp 293 (D NH 1994); Cohen
v San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F Supp 1407 (CD Cal 1995), as discussed in Part
II.B.1 and 2.
95. Tinker, 393 US at 506 ("First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students.").
96. Id.
97. Id at 508.
98. The students "neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the
school affairs or the lives of others. They caused discussion outside of the classroom, but
no interference with work and no disorder." Id at 514.
99. Id at 509 ("In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.").
100. Id at 511.
101. Id at 507.
102. Id at 508. See also id at 510 ("the action of the school authorities appears to
have been based upon an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from
the expression, even by the silent symbol of armbands, of opposition to this Nation's part
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held that such a fear is an impermissible basis for the restriction of free
speech. °3 Drawing upon its general hostility to viewpoint-based restrictions of
free speech,1°4 the Court reaffirmed the fact that, even as an educator, the state
has no right to operate "enclaves of totalitarianism" and may not regard students as "closed-circuit recipients of-only that which the State chooses to
communicate."10 s
Howeve; the Court suggested that schools may restrict student speech if it
would "'substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the
rights of other students.'"' 06 In addition, according to the Court, actually
disruptive speech is, "of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech." 0 7 While, at first glance, Tinker offers protection for the
First Amendment rights of students and teachers, Tinker's broad and open-ended
definition of what constitutes a permissible restriction does not create a principled basis for vigilant protection of academic freedom or the values it serves.
Tinker only prohibits restrictions that are viewpoint-based or that are insufficiently justified by an actual interruption of the work of the school. Consequently, absent the constitutional evils created when the state as school interferes with
the ideas available in the marketplace, the Court defers to the school officials'
judgments about the special mission of the educational system. Nevertheless, the
range of acceptable educational justifications for the restriction of speech is much
greater in the secondary school than in the university setting.0 8

in the conflagration in Vietnam").
103. Id at 508-09 ("Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, [Terminiello v Chicago, 337
US 1 (1949)]; and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of
openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.").
104. Regulation of speech may not confine individuals solely "to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved." Tinker, 393 US at 511. For a more recent
example of this hostility, see Island Trees Union Free Scb D v Pico, 457 US 853 (1982)
(holding local school boards cannot remove books from school library simply because they
dislike the ideas contained in the books).
105. Tinker, 393 US at 511. Applying Tinker in the university, courts must be cautious
because the university's educational mission does not include inculcating "fundamental values . . . essential to a democratic society" and their student population is more mature.
Suppression of university classroom speech carries the danger that it may create a "pall
of orthodoxy" that is antithetical to academic discourse. Keyisbian, 385 US at 603. At the
cost of discomfort, offense, and community outrage, the courts must strive to protect "a
free and open exchange" between university professors and students. Paratev Isibor, 868
F2d 821, 831 (6th Cir 1989).
106. Tinker, 393 US at 509, quoting Sbelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 487 (1960).
107. Tinker, 393 US at 513.

108. Applying Tinker, many courts have recognized that, for the marketplace of ideas
to function most effectively, they must not allow universities to manipulate the viewpoints
or ideas expressed in their classrooms. For example, in his concurrence in Healey v James,
Justice Douglas emphasized academic freedom's contribution to the search for truth:
Students as well as faculty are entitled to credentials in their search for truth. If we
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Therefore, the Court's failure to address the inherent benefits of academic
freedom itself, especially the preservation of autonomy, may be the root of the
Court's less than energetic protection of speech."0 9 For example, Tinker leaves
speech that causes disruption or upset unprotected even if it represents a significant contribution to the formation of students' values and beliefs. An autonomybased conception of academic freedom, on the other hand, justifies greater
constitutional protection."'
B. PICKERING V BOARD OF EDUCATION

In Pickering,a high school teacher challenged his termination as a violation
of his First Amendment rights. The teacher was fired because he sent a letter to
a local newspaper that was critical of the school board's handling of bond issue
programs and the allocation of money between the school's educational and athletic programs. Failing to address academic freedom or the role of education in
any respect, the Supreme Court's charqcterization of the case ignored any
distinctions between Pickering as a teacher ana Pickering as a public employee.

are to become an integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo
opposed to change, students and faculties should have communal interests in which
each age learns from the other.
408 US 169, 197 (1972) (Douglas concurring). Students should be afforded academic
freedom not only so that they may learn, but so that teachers and society at large may
learn from them.
Similarly, in the university setting, courts have found implicit value in preserving
variety in teaching methods and approaches to various subjects. In Dube v State University
of New York, 900 F2d 587, 598 (2d Cir 1990), the court found that a professor's
characterization of apartheid, Nazism, and Zionism as racism, to the outrage of many
Jewish government officials and community activists, was an unreasonable basis for the
denial of tenure. Concluding that the First Amendment "tolerates neither laws nor other
means of coercion, persuasion or intimidation 'that cast a pall of orthodoxy' over the free
exchange of ideas in the classroom," id at 598 (citations omitted), the court found the
professor's controversial statements were protected as part of his classroom exchange of
ideas about racism. In another teaching methods case, the court concluded that "the mere
dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency.'" DiBona v
Matthews, 220 Cal App 3d 1329, 1346 (Cal Ct App, 4th Dist 1990), quoting Papish v
University of MO, 410 US 667 (1973), (affording First Amendment protection to a drama
professor's decision to put on a drama performance containing indecent language and
dealing with offensive topics). The risk that suppression will serve as "a convenient guise
for banning the expression of unpopular views" would not be tolerated. DiBona, 220 Cal
App 3d at 1348, quoting Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971).
109. Alternatively, Tinker recognizes that academic freedom in secondary education is
limited by the nature of secondary education and the immaturity of high school students.
However; Tinker must be evaluated in terms of academic freedom more generally since
many courts have applied Tinker's analysis in higher education. See note 110.
110. For example, while legitimately interfering with the school's work, speech that is
disruptive may also significantly contribute to the academic freedom and growth of
students and teachers.
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In Pickering, the Court articulated a balancing test in which the government's legitimate interest as an employer in maintaining an efficient workplace
is curtailed by the employee's right as a citizen to comment upon "matters of
public concern."111 As applied to classroom speech, however, Pickering has
served to limit the scope of the First Amendment and academic freedom because
courts that apply Pickeringare not attentive to the special concerns posed by the
suppression of classroom speech, especially in the university setting.
Under Pickering, classroom speech is not extended any constitutional
protection beyond that afforded ordinary workplace speech. Therefore, if the
government or the university can produce some legitimate reason for its suppression, classroom speech merits constitutional protection only if its content is
found to include a "matterfl of public concern,"'---for example, it addresses
a matter that is "vital to informed decision-making by the electorate" and is
"currently the subject of public attention.""' While perhaps encompassing a
wide variety of subjects, compared to the limitless subjects pursued by students
and teachers in universities, Pickering's "matter of public concern" formulation
simply does not provide adequate room for academic freedom in the university
classroom.
None of the Supreme Court's cases explicitly addressing the concept of
academic freedom have ever suggested that in order to be protected, its exercise
must meet a "public concern" test. 14 Yet, that is exactly the result that lower
courts adopting the Pickering balancing test have achieved. 1 ' Therefore, at

111. Pickering, 391 US at 568. While it was once held that public employees waived
their First Amendment rights as a condition of public employment, the Court insisted that
the government cannot be strictly regarded as only an employer in this context. Since the
public employee is both an employee and a citizen, covered by the Constitution, the
government's ability to restrict the speech of public employees is limited.
112. Id. According to some commentators, "it is unlikely that classroom speech would
ever rise to the level of being 'a matter of public concern.'" Linda S. Lovely, Beyond "the

Freedom to do Good and not to Teach Evil": A Professors' Academic Freedom Rights in
Classrooms of Public Higher Education, 26 Wake Forest L Rev 711, 730 (1991).
However, the veracity of this conclusion depends upon the way courts interpret what constitutes a "matter of public concern." If, for example, all racist and sexist speech was
deemed to convey the idea that blacks or women are inferior and should be treated as
such by our political system, then all racist and sexist speech could be immunized as
speech on a matter of public concern. While, as stated, this example is extreme, a similarly misguided application of the "matter of public concern" test animated both Silva and
Cohen. See Part IILB.1 and 2.

113. Picketing, 391 US at 572.
114. Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say,
Does That Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 Wayne L Rev 1, 41

(1993).
115. For example, in Clark v Holmes, 474 F2d 928 (7th Cir 1972), the Seventh Circuit
utilized Pickering to deny protection to a teacher's classroom speech. Holding that Clark's
alleged overemphasis on sex in his health survey course and his excessive counseling of
students were not speech on "'matters of public concern'" as required for protection under
Pickering, the Seventh Circuit upheld the university's decision not to rehire Clark. Id at
931. While recognizing that these matters involved Clark as a teacher rather than as an
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least as far as classroom speech is concerned, Pickering's "public concern"
inquiry seems entirely irrelevant to the real interests at stake." 6

interested citizen, the court used this distinction to extend Clark less protection than even
the average public employee. Id (noting that Clark irresponsibly made remarks to a captive
audience that was dependent on him for grades and recommendations). Instead, while the
result may have been no different, Clark's role as a teacher should have afforded him an
extra level of constitutional protection under the academic freedom doctrine.
In Martin v Parrish, 805 F2d 583 (5th Cir 1986), the Fifth Circuit similarly relied
upon Pickering to hold that an economics professor had no First Amendment right to use
profane language including "hell," "damn," "sucks," and "bullshit" in his class. Because
the only purpose of Martin's language was to express frustration with his class in an
attempt to motivate them, the court concluded that there "is no doubt that Martin's
epithets did not address a matter of public concern." Id at 585. Therefore, under
Pickering, Martin's language had no claim to First Amendment protection. The court also
agreed with the college that use of such language "degrades [the professor's] important
mission and detracts from the subjects he is trying to teach." Id. While this may be true,
if academic freedom means anything, it should encompass a teacher's decision that his
class' poor attitude is detracting from the teaching of economics and that a down and
dirty speech given in the students' language might motivate them to learn better, although
academic freedom should not condone the verbal abuse of students.
116. For example, faced with the challenge of selecting a test to evaluate the classroom
speech of a business school professor, a district court in Scalet v Rosenblum, 911 F Supp
999, 1011 (W D Va 1996), aff'd 1997 WL 33077 (4th Cir), reluctantly selected the
Pickering test while acknowledging the lack of judicial guidance and the lack of a fully
satisfactory test. In particular, the court noted its "reservations about extending the
Pickering analysis to the in-class speech of university professors and graduate school
instructors since the test does not explicitly account for the robust tradition of academic
freedom in those quarters." Id. In order to mitigate this problem, the court attempted to
account for academic freedom by "properly defining the extent of the teacher's interest in
the speech." Id. Although the court adopted an expansive view of what constitutes a matter of public concern and held that the professor's classroom speech concerning diversity
related to a matter of public concern, id at 1014, in order to fully safeguard academic
freedom values, more than simply the teacher's interest must be factored into the balance.
Both students and society at large also have compelling interests in the preservation of the
academic freedom rights of professors because restrictions of academic freedom threaten
the culture of independence and the free flow of information required for personal
autonomy.
Some courts have attempted to recharacterize the Pickering balancing test to take
account of academic freedom. The Second Circuit has utilized Pickering balancing with a
special consideration placed on the teacher's exercise of his academic freedom. See
Mahoney v Hankin, 593 F Supp 1171, 1175 (SDNY 1984).
However, the Seventh Circuit has also factored in "institutional" academic freedom,
or deference to the autonomy of the university. "The effect of this innovation is to cancel
out academic freedom as a possible factor to be weighed in Pickering balancing on the
side of teacher's speech interests, by placing something called institutional 'academic
freedom' on the side of purported 'governmental interests.'" Hiers, 40 Wayne L Rev at 42
(cited in note 114).
Neither approach seems to provide adequate protection for purely academic classroom speech.
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III. A Conflict of Rights?:
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment In the Classroom
Numerous recent studies indicate that sexual harassment of students is a
significant problem on our campuses.117 In response to this problem, many
colleges and universities have adopted regulations banning the sexual harassment
of students by teachers and/or other students."" While these regulations also
have prompted concern over the free speech and academic freedom rights of
students and have collided with the case law generally disapproving campus hate
speech codes,"' this Comment will focus on the claims of faculty that hostile
learning environment sexual harassment regulations impermissibly restrict their
academic freedom in the classroom."'
Ann Franke, counsel for the AAUP, has recently observed that universities
are experiencing a sharp increase in the number of sexual harassment cases that
concern the content of classroom lectures or reading material.' With the lack
of a clear dividing line between sexual harassment and academic discourse, "'the

117. Walter B. Connolly, Jr., and Alison B. Marshall, Sexual Harassment of University

or College Students by Faculty Members, 15 J Coil & Univ L 381, 382-83 (1988).
118. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 extends the prohibition against sex
discrimination contained in Title VII to educational institutions. Alexander v Yale University, 459 F Supp 1 (D Conn 1977), aff'd, 631 F2d 178 (2d Cir 1980), was the first time
a court determined that sexual harassment of university students constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX and Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677 (1979) recognized
a private cause of action for sex discrimination under Title IX.
119. Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852 (E D Mich 1989); UWM Post v
Bd of Regents, 774 F Supp 1163 (E D Wis 1991); R.A.V. v St. Paul, 112 SCt 2541

(1992); Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v George Mason U, 993 F2d 386, 393
(4th Cir 1993) (Court held sanctions imposed on basis of fraternity "ugly woman contest"
skit were unconstitutional restriction of free speech. "The mischief was the University's
punishment of those who scoffed at its goals of racial integration and gender neutrality,
while permitting, even encouraging, conduct that would further the viewpoint expressed in
the University's goals and probably embraced by a majority of society as well.").
120. Most regulations also restrict quid pro quo sexual harassment, but such regulations

do not generally raise free speech concerns as the prohibited conduct is not pure speech.
In addition, this Comment will not delve into the problem of sexual harassment and
free speech in the workplace. While there are many parallels, there are also significant
differences in the interests at stake and the extent of First Amendment protection in the
workplace versus the university. "Advocates claim that offensive speech creates a hostile
learning environment for students subjected to hate speech. But the university setting is different from the workplace. Workplace speech is generally limited to that which is
necessary to get the job done, and restrictions are permitted on speech that gets in the
way of the job. University education, on the other hand, requires that students confront
and engage in speech that is often offensive and disagreeable. The heart of undergraduate
and graduate education takes place in the context of wide open debate." Jeanne M.

Craddock, Constitutional Law-"Words that Injure; Laws that Silence": Campus Hate
Speech Codes and the Threat to American Education, 22 Fla St U L Rev 1047, 1049
(1995).
121. Neil W. Hamilton, Contrastsand ComparisonsAmong McCartbyism, 1960s Student
Activism and 1990s Faculty Fundamentalism, 22 Wm Mitchell L Rev 369, 387 (1996).
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concern is that a kind of self-censorship takes place and gets in the way of
legitimate subjects of academic inquiry.'"'2 With blurry standards like those
developed in Tinker and Pickering handicapping the exercise of academic
freedom in our universities, regulation's chilling effect on the university classroom speech of students and professors continues to inhibit the university
marketplace of ideas and education's ability to foster both democracy and
autonomy.
A.

BANNING SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS:

PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY IN EDUCATION

The student victims of sexual harassment have a significant interest in
equality in education. Sex discrimination, including sexual harassment, promotes
gender inequality in the university, an environment in which "equality is crucially
guaranteed."" z Some observers complain that the courts' treatment of the
tension between free speech and equality created by sexual harassment regulations is generally one-sided. In their view, "[e]ducational equality, the schools' interest in the regulations at issue, is barely mentioned. [Instead, w]hat had been
bigoted acts and terrorist threats suddenly become conversational gambits,
theoretical trial balloons, and incipient poetry" 2 4 and are protected under the
guise of academic freedom.
Advocates of university regulation of sexual harassment point to the harms
women suffer from sexual harassment. Women who are subjected to a sexually
hostile environment typically suffer from a great deal of stress. This stress may
affect a woman's performance, attendance record, psychological heath, and
physical health."2 Sexual harassment may also convey the message that women
are sexual objects before they are contributing members of adult society: "whether it is consciously undertaken or not, such behavior serves to reinforce women's
sexual role."' 26 These stereotypical conceptions of women make it less likely

that women will be viewed as competent, intelligent, and capable of success. As
a result, women are then less likely to be given the opportunity to prove their
abilities and develop their skills. Sexual harassment creates an inhospitable, and
even abusive, educational environment for women; thus, sexual harassment
functions in much the same way as overt exclusion to create a significant barrier
to equal opportunity in education. The denial of women's educational equality
sustains women's subordinate social and work status and subverts women's
pursuit of autonomy.

122. Id (quoting Ann Franke).
123. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words 54 (Harvard 1993). See also note 120.
124. Id at 55.
125. Peggy Crull, Sexual Harassment and Women's Health, in Wendy Chavkin, ed, Double Exposure: Women's Health Hazards on the Job and in the Home 107 (Monthly Rev
1983).
126. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination,21 BC L Rev 345, 361 (1980).
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Raz's account of autonomy recognizes how harms that operate in a manner
similar to sexual harassment limit personal autonomy. With harm defined in
terms of autonomy, Raz asserts that "[d]epriving a person of opportunities or of
the ability to use them is a way of causing him harm." 127 Even a few extreme
cases of mere offense may cause harm within Raz's vocabulary: "Serious and
persistent offence may well reduce a person's opportunities. It may even affect
his ability to use the opportunities he has or frustrate his pursuit of his
goals."'2
Unfortunately, discrimination in the form of hostile environment sexual
harassment is pervasive. Moreover, both the legislature and the courts acknowledge that the harms caused by sexual harassment in the university setting are
especially acute. Observing that "'[d]iscrimination against minorities and women
in the field of education is as pervasive as discrimination in any other area,'"
legislatures and courts are troubled by the dangers posed by sexually hostile
educational environments to the success of our universities.' Recognizing that
educational institutions expose our Nation's youth to a multitude of ideas that
will strongly influence their future development, they assert: "'To permit [any]
discrimination here would, more than in any other area,' 30tend to promote
misconceptions leading to future patterns of discrimination. "
B. THE JUDICIARY ADDRESSES PROFESSORS' SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN THE CLASSROOM

In two recent cases, courts have been challenged with the constitutionality of
disciplining a professor found to have violated a university's hostile environment
sexual harassment policy. In Silva v University of New Hampshire,"' the court
held Silva's use of sexual analogies in teaching a writing course was protected by
the academic freedom inherent in the First Amendment while barely acknowledging the students' equality interests. On the other hand, in Cohen v San
Bernardino Valley College,' the interests of equality in education prevailed

127. Raz, The Morality of Freedom at 413 (cited in note 47).
128. Id. However, Raz is careful to note that most instances of offense do not cause
the type of harm that implicates autonomy. According to Raz, many, if not most, "cases

of causing offence fall short of this.... It is of interest to note that pain and offence,
hurt and the like are harmful only when they do affect options or projects." Id.
129. Brown v Trustees of Boston U, 891 F2d 337, 345 (1st Cir 1989), quoting HR
Rep No 238, 92d Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1972 US Code Cong & Admin News 2173,
2154-55 (addressing Congress' specific intention to apply Title VIl's prohibitions against

discrimination to educational institutions).
130. Id, quoting HR Rep No 554 92nd Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1972 US Code
Cong & Admin News 2462, 2511-12.
131. 888 F Supp 293, 298 (D NH 1994).
132. 883 F Supp 1407, 1412 (C D Cal 1995). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's holding as to the First Amendment claims of Cohen because it found the college's
sexual harassment policy to be "unconstitutionally vague" as applied to Cohen in this
case. See Cohen v San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F3d 968, 971 (9th Cir 1996)
("Cohen 11"), cert denied, 117 S Ct 1290 (1997). However, because the Ninth Circuit's
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over Cohen's free speech interests because the court found the academic freedom
doctrine inconclusive and dealt with Cohen's speech under a Pickering analysis.
Since neither analysis is entirely satisfactory, Silva and Cohen force us to reevaluate the results of the earlier classroom speech cases and the propriety of relying
on Tinker and Pickering to protect the autonomy interests of professors, students, and the larger community. Furthermore, Silva and Cohen indicate the
difficulty of finding the appropriate balance between the university's compelling
interest in regulating the professor's classroom speech and the acute risk of
creating a politically-correct "pall of orthodoxy" in the classroom.
1. Silva v University of New Hampshire
Though a ringing endorsement of university professors' academic freedom
interests, Silva fails to address adequately the harmful effect of sexual harassment
on students' academic freedom and the autonomy of female students. Silva, a
university writing instructor, was disciplined for violating the university's sexual
harassment policy that prohibited
"verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature [when] such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating a hostile or offensive working or academic environment.... Examples of conduct which may, if continued or repeated,
constitute sexual harassment are: ...

derogatory gender-based humor."' 33

The incidents alleged to constitute Silva's sexual harassment included: 1) comparing focus in a thesis statement to sex in a graphic manner; 2) explaining how a
definition may benefit from the use of a metaphor by describing belly dancing as
"like jello on a plate with a vibrator under the plate"; 3) making personally or
sexually offensive statements to female students during various library exercises;
and 4) using a "time management problem" to elicit personal information from
students.'
Adopting a multi-factor test, the Silva court concluded that a case-by-case
inquiry into whether the legitimate interests of the university are sufficient to
restrict a teacher's speech is required. According to the court,
the propriety of regulations or sanctions must depend on such circumstances as the age and sophisticationof the students, the closeness of the relation
between the specific technique used and the concededly35 valid educational
objective, and the context and manner of presentation.
holding rested on vagueness grounds, the court "decline[d] to define today the precise
contours of the protection the First Amendment provides the classroom speech of college
professors." Id. Therefore, I will continue to use the district court's opinion as an example
of one court's attempt to define the constitutionally protected parameters of a college
professor's classroom speech.
133. Silva, 888 F Supp at 298, quoting University System of New Hampshire Sexual
Harassment Policy.
134. Id at 298-311.
135. Id at 313 (emphasis original), quoting Mailloux v Kiley, 448 F2d 1242, 1243 (1st
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Because the court found Silva's students to be "adults" with presumably adult
sophistication and concluded that Silva's comments were made in a "professionally appropriate way," the court held that Silva's statements advanced his "valid
educational objective" of conveying the principles of focus and definition as
related to the subject matter of his writing course. Moreover, the court found
that the sexual harassment policy was not "reasonably related" to the
university's "legitimate pedagogical concern of providing a congenial academic
environment" because its standard was subjective and found that the policy
the First Amendment interest in academic freedom of
failed to take into account136
both Silva and the nation.
Then, alternatively applying the Pickering approach,137 the Silva court
concluded that Silva's classroom speech was on a matter of public concern
because

[it

is a fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that the
preservation of academic freedom is a matter of public concern. Further,
the issue of whether speech which is offensive to a particular class of
should be tolerated in American schools is a matter of public
individuals
38
concern.1

However, such a public concern analysis is misguided. Although Silva's arguably
offensive speech raised the public issue of whether offensive speech should be
tolerated in the university, Silva's offensive remarks were not themselves addressed to this issue. Silva was not punished for speech on a political or social
issue, but for using sexually hostile remarks to teach writing. If the court's
flawed interpretation of what constitutes a public concern were widely adopted,
the harassing speech of university professors would be insulated in almost every
case, regardless of the particular circumstances. Affording Silva's speech the
status of speech on a matter of public concern extends Silva's remarks a quasipolitical status such that they appear to invoke the core concerns of the First
Amendment. Given this mistaken analysis, it is not surprising that the court held
that Silva's interest in this speech was "overwhelmingly superior to the [university's] interest in proscribing said speech" 3 9 to foster a congenial academic
environment. 1

Cir 1971).
136. Id at 314.
137. Exactly what the court is doing here is unclear. The court appears to treat its
application of the Pickering "matter of public concern" test as a separate "claim," id, but
also imports its conclusion that Cohen's speech merits academic freedom protection under
the multi-factor test into the Pickering "balancing test." Id at 316.
138. Id at 315-16 (citations omitted).
139. Id at 316.
140. The University of New Hampshire settled the case by reinstating Silva to his
teaching position, and providing $60,000 in back pay and $170,000 for legal expenses.
The National AAUP censured the University for violating academic freedom and due
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2. Cohen v San Bernardino Valley College
In Cohen v San Bernardino Valley College,'41 the court addressed the discipline of a tenured English professor for creating a hostile, sexually discriminatory
educational environment. Students claimed that Cohen discussed subjects such as
"obscenity, [pornography], and consensual sex with children;" used vulgarities
and profanity in the classroom; read articles from Hustler and Playboy to the
42
class; and had a propensity to look down the shirts of female students.'
The court first considered whether academic freedom prevents a state college
from limiting teacher classroom speech in order to prevent the creation of a
hostile, sexually discriminatory educational environment and thereby fulfill its
mission of effectively educating its students.'43 Reviewing the academic freedom
case law, the court noted that academic freedom's "parameters ... are not
distinct, particularly in relation to the potential conflict with a university's duty
to ensure adequate education of its students.""4
Finding that academic freedom does not necessarily protect university
professors' classroom speech, the Cohen court turned to the Pickering line of
public employee speech cases under which "the government as employer has far
broader powers to restrict its employees' speech than does the government as
sovereign. This broad power is based on the government's interest in efficiently
46
carrying out its mission."' 45 Following Martin v Parrish,1
the court held
that "Cohen's profanity [was] not speech on a matter of public concern."' 4 7
However, extending the public concern analysis beyond its core concerns like the
Silva court, the Cohen court found that use of pornography and other sexuallyoriented topics were "matters of concern to the community," as opposed to
4
speech that concerns the "'minutiae of workplace grievances.'"' 1
Since the court held that Cohen's classroom speech included matters of
public concern, the court proceeded to balance the university's interests against
Cohen's First Amendment interests. Finding that the university had a legitimate
interest in fostering the education of all its students, the court observed that
Cohen's focus on sexual topics and teaching style evidently disrupted the educational process for many students and "prevented them from learning."' 49 Moreover, one evaluator of Cohen's class found his approach to many of the controversial topics led to self-censorship and actually hindered free inquiry and the

process in the application of its sexual harassment guidelines. See Courtney Leatherman,
Free Speech or Harassment?, Chron of Higher Educ A22 (Sept 28, 1994).
141. 883 F Supp 1407 (1995).
142. Id at 1410.
143. Id at 1409-10.
144. Id at 1414.
145. Id at 1415 (citations omitted).
146. 805 F2d 583 (5th Cir 1986).
147. Cohen, 883 F Supp at 1416.
148. Id at 1416-17 (citations omitted).
149. Id at 1418.
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unfettered exchange of ideas.'" The court also noted that the university, as a
public employe; had an interest in regulating speech to foster "harmony among
co-workers," 5 1 but did not evidence any understanding that "the category of
'coworkers' could conceivably include students, as well as faculty members and
school administrators.""
Therefore, the university's mission "to effectively educate students, keeping
in mind students' varying backgrounds and sensitivities [, and the university's]
right to preclude disruption of this educational mission through the creation of
a hostile learning environment" outweighed Cohen's academic freedom to the
extent that the university was not censoring Cohen. ls3 Falling short of censorship, the university's response was found to be reasonable and specifically
tailored to achieve its mission." 4 The university sanctioned Cohen and required
him to "warn students of his teaching style and topics so that those students for
whom this approach is ineffective [could] make an informed choice as to their
educations."" 5 The court pointed out that such restrictions are limited to the
power of the College as a public employer to regulate its employees' speech to
promote efficiency in delivering its service, similar to a public employer prohibiting its employees from "'being rude to customers'" in order to promote better
delivery of its services.'Y 6
The unsettled nature of the law governing cases like Silva and Cohen is
evidenced by the Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in Cohen v San Bernardino
Valley College ("Cohen R"). s ' The Ninth Circuit enjoined the College's discipline of Cohen because it found the College's sexual harassment policy to be
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Cohen. According to the Ninth Circuit,
this result was mandated because "Cohen's speech did not fall within the core
region of sexual harassment as defined by the Policy" and Cohen had no
warning that the speech that he had "used for many years" might be barred by
5 In other words, Cohen could not have been expected to know
the policy."
that his speech had the "'effect of... creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive learning environment' 15 9 or, even if he could have been expected to

150. Id at 1419.
151. Id at 1415 (discussing the Pickering balancing test applied to a high school
journalism teacher's freedom of expression rights in Nicholson v Bd of Educ, 682 F2d

858, 965 (9th Cir 1982)).
152. Donna Prokop, Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between First
Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S Cal L Rev 2533, 2552 (1993).
153. Cohen, 883 F Supp at 1420.
154. Finding that the university's sexual harassment policy was unconstitutionally applied
because it was "too vague," 92 F3d at 972, the Ninth Circuit in Cohen II did not
address whether the university's response would have been reasonable had the policy been
constitutionally applied.
155. Cohen, 883 F Supp at 1420.
156. Id at 1421.
157. 92 F3d 968 (9th Cir 1996).

158. Id at 972.
159. Id (quoting the College's sexual harassment policy).

114 Roundtable

[4:85

appreciate the nature of the environment his speech was creating, Cohen was not
responsible because he had been engaging in the prohibited speech without
penalty for many years.
The Ninth Circuit, by expressing great deference to the First Amendment
rights of professors, escaped the need to tackle the difficult issues raised by a
more comprehensive understanding of the rights of both professors and students.
Therefore, like the other courts before it, the Cohen II court, without analyzing
academic freedom or the values it supports, "decline[d] to define ...the precise

contours of the protection the First Amendment provides the classroom speech
of college professors""' and declined to decide whether universities may punish
sexually hostile classroom speech so long as their policies are "clearer" and
"more precise. " "'
IV. Maximizing Autonomy: Better Protection for the Rights of Both
Professors and Students in the Classroom
Application of the federal guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment in public
universities, without special attention to the needs of teaching and scholarship,
may very likely circumscribe academic freedom. At the same time, however,
unreflectively applying academic freedom as a trump without regard to the
special harms created by sexual harassment in the classroom simply privileges
one contributor to the exercise of autonomy, namely academic freedom, over
another equally important contributor, namely equal access to education.
Regardless, courts dealing with sexual harassment in the university classroom
have tended to privilege either academic freedom or equality, thereby creating an
apparent conflict between the professor's academic freedom and female students'
right to educational equality.
Such a conflict, however, is illusory and can be avoided by privileging
autonomy, which embraces the values served by both academic freedom and
educational equality. By privileging academic freedom, courts have generally
disregarded the fact that students, as well as professors, have compelling academic freedom interests." 2 By privileging educational equality, courts have ignored
the fact that equal access to education, if that education is characterized by a
"pall of orthodoxy," does little to further the autonomy of either female or male
students." 3 On the other hand, by privileging autonomy, courts could turn

160. Id at 971.
161. Id at 972 ("We do not decide whether the College could punish speech of this

nature if the Policy were more precisely construed by authoritative interpretive guidelines
or if the College were to adopt a clearer and more precise policy.").
162. Even courts that bend over backwards to protect academic freedom seemingly fail
to recognize that, by the time they are confronted with a case of sexual harassment in the
university classroom, the academic freedom of both professors and students has already
been compromised. If these courts took notice of the academic freedom interests at stake
beyond the university's institutional interests, they could no longer justify their inaction by
hiding behind a fear of infringing academic freedom.
163. Of course, equal access to such an education would also fail to further the search
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their attention to fashioning a remedy for such sexual harassment that both
reinvigorates academic freedom as it concerns the rights of professors and
students to develop their autonomy and promotes equality as it concerns the
right of both male and female students to develop their autonomy within an
environment of educational equality.
Therefore, future courts addressing sexually hostile educational environments
must seek to maximize the autonomy of the relevant individuals and communities. An autonomy-maximizing approach best captures the rights and interests at
stake when academic freedom and equality appear to conflict.
A. A NEw Tu:

BALANCING THE HARMS TO AUTONOMY

Faced with an individual professor's speech that creates a sexually hostile
educational environment, a court should first identify the autonomy interests that
are infringed by the alleged hostile environment and the autonomy interests that
will be infringed if the court chooses to intervene to suppress the hostile
speech.'" In so doing, the court must keep in mind that the university plays an
important role in the autonomy not only of professors and students, but of the
individual members of society at large.)65 Then, the court should balance these
harms to determine their relative importance, as evidenced by the degree to
which they restrict autonomy by detracting from the mental capacities, range of
options, and independence that autonomy requires. Finally, striking the balance
in favor of causing the least harm to autonomy overall, the court should fashion
a remedy that seeks not only to cause the least damage to present autonomy
interests, but that seeks to create the conditions that will best allow autonomy to
flourish into the future.
Future cases will share many similarities. Therefore, an analysis of some
issues raised by the various sets of interests that courts should examine may be
helpful. These interests include professors' autonomy interests, the autonomy
interests of all students, the autonomy interests of female victims, the university's
autonomy interests, and society's autonomy interests.
1. Professors' Autonomy Interests
While regulating the classroom speech of professors is considered to be a
clear violation of their academic freedom and autonomy interests, this may not
always be so. For example, courts should consider the extent to which the
academic freedom of professors is limited by their duty to comply with the
professional norms of academic discourse. Since membership in the academic

for truth or the pursuit of democracy.
164. Courts must recognize, however, that any given set of interests will not always fall
on the same side of the autonomy balance and may even contain elements that counsel
both for and against regulation.
165. Reference to the autonomy interests of society or a given community in this Comment is meant to signify the accumulated personal autonomy interests of each individual

that constitutes that society or community, not some interest in that group as a group.
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community requires a certain level of talent and training, professors' academic
speech is often subject to disciplinary norms not thought to raise any academic
freedom concerns. For example, professors' speech is often judged and indirectly
regulated through promotion and tenure decisions. According to J. Peter Byrne,
such regulation exists without controversy
because academics traditionally believe that the ends of scholarship and
teaching are advanced by adherence to collective criteria. Thus, the fact
that universities function through speech and the criticism of ideas does not
mean that speech ought to be under less restriction there than in society as
a whole; on the contrary, both scholarship and learning necessarily involve
the discipline of speech to improve it. 6 '
As a result, many scholars suggest that sexually harassing classroom speech
can be disciplined without affront to academic freedom because sexual harassment is by definition unconnected to academic discourse or scholarship.'
When sexually harassing faculty members go far outside "'the bounds of scholarly standards of inquiry,'" their academic freedom may not be implicated.168
However, if the scope of "proper" scholarship is narrowly defined, tying academic freedom protection to this definition may leave much speech that makes
a vital contribution to autonomy vulnerable to regulation. In fact, at the fringes
of academic discourse is probably where academic freedom is most needed.
2. Students' Autonomy Interests
As discussed above,"' courts must be especially tolerant of the wide range
of discourse and the open-ended marketplace of ideas required by the academic
freedom, and therefore autonomy, interests of both professors and students. For
example, courts should not ignore the potential "need to enhance an individual's
education through the introduction of new, and sometimes offensive, ideas." 7 '
Autonomy requires an educational marketplace of ideas as a backstop against the
culture of conformity. Autonomy flourishes best when the environment supports

an allegiance to individuality and personal truth:

166. J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79
Georgetown L J 399, 417 (1991).
167. In some cases, such as where a professor comments on the physical attributes of
a particular student, it may be clear that the classroom speech has no real connection to
the academic project. In most cases, however, this will be largely a matter of opinion and
perspective. Take, for example, a biblical scholar at the Chicago Theological Seminary who
was reprimanded for retelling a sexual story from the Talmud in his class. See Kenneth
Jost, Questionable Conduct, 80 ABA J 70, 72 (Nov 1994). Should our characterization of
his speech change if we learn that he has a history of improper physical contact with
female students? Id.
168. Prokop, 66 S Cal L Rev at 2566 (cited in note 152).
169. See Part I.A.3.
170. Craddock, 22 Fla St U L Rev at 1058 (cited in note 120).
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Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising
intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any
bold, vigorous, .independent train of thought, lest it should land them in
something
which would admit of being considered irreligious or immor1 71
al?
Even in cases where the initial balance of harms tips towards regulation,
courts must understand that the regulation of sexually harassing speech may in
fact damage the academic freedom interests of students and professors to such a
degree that the balance of harms tips away from regulation. For example, the
chilling effect of sexual harassment regulations, which are almost by necessity
vague as to what forms of speech are prohibited, is staggering. By forcing wellmeaning students and professors to steer clear of any speech that may be deemed
hostile or offensive, the experimentation and innovation that produce quality
education and contribute to the autonomy of all people will be stunted, if not
completely destroyed.
On the other hand, the harm to autonomy may be less if the courts put their
faith in the give and take of the educational marketplace of ideas. Maximizing
autonomy might require that
the answer to the scurrilous problems of bigotry and hatred must be more
speech and better speech. The force of speech and counter speech in the
push for social change cannot be underestimated, and the university is1 the
primary place in which students learn the value and power of speech. 7
Conceiving of each autonomous individual as a mini-laboratory of social change,
education should produce options rather than remove them. Counterspeech
supports the exchange of reasons in the public sphere that demonstrates our
"commitment to respecting the autonomy of people who listen to speech." 73
Furthermore, courts should remember Mill's warnings and acknowledge that
even if administrators could dismiss the message of sexual harassment and
inequality as clearly false, restriction of that falsehood would damage students'
autonomy. If students are force-fed the message of equality and denied exposure
to ideas of inequality, however hateful, students' autonomy is infringed. Suppression of inequality ideas for any reason is harmful to autonomy because it
interferes with the process of individual choice that allows individuals to call
their beliefs and reasons for acting their own. Equality must be "fully, frequently,
and fearlessly discussed, [or else] it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living
truth."174 Unless equality is passionately embraced, the likely result would be

171.
172.
173.
174.

Mill, On Liberty 32-33 (cited in note 11).
Craddock, 22 Fla St U L Rev at 1058 (cited in note 120).
Sunstein, Academic Freedom and Law at 96 (cited in note 24).
Mill, On Liberty 34 (cited in note 11).
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a mindless equality of sameness instead of a vivid understanding of equality that
can account for the ways in which men and women are undeniably different.
3. The Autonomy Rights of Female Victims
Even though respecting the equality and autonomy rights of female victims
of sexual harassment is a difficult task, courts must embrace this endeavor. The
harms to women caused by sexual harassment in the classroom are real and
significant.s Cases alleging a sexually hostile educational environment seek to
enforce the equal right of female students to receive a quality education and to
be free from such serious harms, not to shield women from sexual references or
adult discourse that may upset or offend them. If sexual harassment makes its
victims feel "that they're not an equal in the academic environment, it actually
curtails academic freedom because students have academic freedom [interests]
just as teachers do."' 17
Thus, courts must be aware that sexual harassment regulations may sometimes hurt the very victims they attempt to help. Sexual harassment regulations,
like other bans on hate speech, may have perverse effects:
they may replicate the very marginalization that they are meant to subvert,
carrying a subtext that victims cannot talk back for themselves. They may

stifle in the name of civility and reason the most empowering responses,
which sometimes consist of shouting back angrily in kind. They may
backfire by turning the haters into martyrs, giving their hate speech magnified publicity and effect." 7
As a result, courts must scrutinize regulations to insure that women are not being

portrayed as helpless victims. Courts should portray the sexes as enjoying equal
rights to autonomy. If a court's message denies women social and academic
recognition of their autonomy, that court may unwittingly help perpetuate the

sexualization and objectification of women that sexual harassment regulations
attempt to eliminate.

175. See Part IMl.A. Sexual harassment for this purpose is speech that creates a sexually
hostile environment in the classroom. For example, drawing on the Supreme Court's
definition of hostile work environment under Title VII, a hostile or abusive educational environment is created when "the classroom is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive." Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc.,
510 US 17, 21 (1993) (citations omitted).
176. Jost, 80 Nov ABA J at 71 (cited in note 167).
177. Richard H. Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup Ct Rev 1, 55 (1994), quoting Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The First Amendment Wars, The New Republic 35, 40 (Sept 28, 1992). See also
Dworkin, New Interpretation at 195 ("it seems equally likely that such measures exacerbate prejudice by allowing its more subtle forms to mask as outrage against censorship")
(cited in note 4).
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4. The University's Autonomy Interests
Universities also have important interests at stake in the regulation of sexual
harassment in their classrooms. Universities are justifiably concerned with the
promotion of academic freedom and educational equality, but have additional
concerns unique to universities.
J. Peter Byrne, for example, suggests that the "university should properly be
seen as a distinct social entity, whose commitment to enhancing the quality of
speech justifies setting minimum standards for the manner of speech among its
members." 78 While "the first amendment renders state universities powerless
to punish speakers for advocating any idea in a reasoned manne;" 179 Byrne
suggests that universities may have the right to regulate the profane, obscene,
indecent, abusive, or hostile aspects of classroom speech deriving from their
interest in avoiding disruption to the educational enterprise. Within this context,
courts must remember that the sexually hostile environment's "language of
contempt and hatred can 'disrupt' higher education just as seriously as can
heckling speakers or barricading classrooms, even if the harm is less immediate
or specifically sited."18' Therefore, courts should consider whether the university has a compelling interest in addressing sexually harassing classroom speech
through time, place or manner restrictions."' In any given case, however,
courts must continue to balance the harm to autonomy caused by the disruption
to the educational process with the harm to autonomy caused by limiting the
availability of hostility, obscenity, or sexuality as options to consider in making
18 2
decisions about one's life.
Similarly, courts must consider the importance of the university's widelyrecognized right to establish the curriculum of its classes.'83 Some commentators use this right to argue, for example, that just as the university may determine that chemistry classes will not include discussion of alchemy, they may
determine that gender inequality will not be taught. They assert that the responsibility and duty of a teacher imbued with academic freedom is that the teacher
"'must not do things that lead to the false instruction of the students in [his or
her] care."'' However even if a university may constitutionally prohibit the
178. Byrne, 79 Georgetown L J at 416 (cited in note 166).
179. Id at 400.

180. Id at 436.

181. The Supreme Court is much more tolerant of limitations of speech based on
content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions. While it may be difficult to eliminate
the aspect of sexual harassment restrictions that is aimed at the content of the speech,
decisions such as Healey, 408 US at 192-93 (cited in note 110), suggest that "reasonable
regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in which student[s and
professors] conduct their speech-related activities must be respected."
182. This balance may be closer than it appears at first. We must remember that when
unpopular ideas are expressed, the extent of disruption they are said to cause is often
overstated. Similarly, if we are truly committed to protecting autonomy, freedom of
thought, and free speech, we cannot underestimate the harm caused when unpopular ideas
are regulated.
183. See, for example, Maboney v Hankin, 593 F Supp 1171, 1174 (SDNY 1984).
184. Katherine S. Mangan, A&M's 'Alchemy Caper', Chron of Higher Educ A19 (Jan
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teaching of alchemy in its chemistry classes, regulating classroom speech regarding gender inequality is more akin to deciding whether chemistry will be taught
at all-a much more serious concern than regulating the specific content of a
chemistry class. In addition, courts should be very suspicious of any regulation
based on truth or falsity in teaching, and society should be reluctant to let courts
make such determinations. Lastly, as discussed throughout this Comment, even
if truth is properly identified, the exercise of autonomy demands that individuals
have the freedom to determine what personal "truth" they will allow to govern
their lives.
5. Society's Autonomy Interests
Society's important autonomy interests are directly impacted by what
transpires in universities. If the government, acting through the university, can
tailor the options and information available based on its judgment of what is a
valuable way to live, the autonomy of all individual members of society, not just
professors and students, is harmed. If the government, acting through public
universities, can eliminate views it finds distasteful from the educational marketplace, not only will the search for truth be hindered, but the basis of free speech
as a tool for self-governance and critical, autonomous decision-making is
eliminated. By manipulating what ideas professors have the right to espouse and
students have the right to receive, society's access to these ideas is limited. As a
result, the "process of thinking" that allows all of us to reach autonomous
judgments about any particular issue and to develop our capacities for critical
evaluation that will allow us to exercise autonomy with regard to all issues is
infringed.
B. RETHINKING SILVA AND COHEN IN TERMS OF AUTONOMY
In the final analysis, the results in Silva and Cohen are unsatisfactory because
they represent an incomplete view of the interests at stake in cases of sexual
harassment in the university classroom. Silva privileged academic freedom,
specifically the professor's academic freedom, over any equality concerns. On the
other hand, Cohen found that the equality rights of female students prevailed
because it understated the professor's academic freedom interests. Moreover,
both cases ignored other relevant autonomy interests.
Whatever one thinks of the result in either case, reevaluating these cases in
light of all the relevant autonomy interests reveals that their analysis was
deficient and should not be relied upon in future cases. In light of an autonomymaximizing approach, the extent of this failure and the room for improvement
in future cases is staggering.

19, 1994), quoting Albert Cotton, professor of chemistry at A&M.
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1. Professors' Autonomy Interests
Although both courts embrace the notion of professors' academic freedom
as an important concept, academic freedom carries very different weight for the
Silva and Cohen courts. The Silva court's extreme deference to the academic freedom of professors appears almost outcome-determinative. Drawing upon the
argument from truth and the argument from democracy, the Silva court affirmed
that our Nation is "deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom" as a
"special concern of the First Amendment." 8 '
On the contrary, the Cohen court, finding that academic freedom doctrine
cut in different directions, gave academic freedom no real weight in its
analysis.' 86 According to the court, the professor's "invocation of the 'academic
freedom' doctrine does not adequately address the complex issues presented by
this case. For that reason, this Court declines to hold that SBVC's discipline of
Cohen is precluded by general notions of academic freedom under the First
Amendment."' Since academic freedom did not preclude regulation of Cohen's speech outright, the court appeared willing to dismiss Cohen's academic
freedom rights completely.
After engaging in a Pickering-type analysis of the university as a government
employer, the Cohen court agreed that the university's actions in requiring
Cohen to warn students that he uses a potentially offensive teaching style were
justified,' noting that it would not be so tolerant of the university's regulation
if it amounted to direct censorship of Cohen's speech.'89 The court dismissed
Cohen's academic freedom interests because his ability to teach the same material
in the same manner was not infringed. Howeve; the court's reasoning ignored
the practical effect of such discipline. If Cohen must warn students about his
teaching, it is at least a possible, if not likely outcome, that students will begin
to avoid registering for Cohen's classes. Then, if the enrollment in Cohen's
classes drops below a minimum level, it is also possible that Cohen may feel or
actually be compelled to censor himself. Ignoring such potential chilling effects
on Cohen's exercise of his academic freedom and autonomy was reckless.

185. Silva, 888 F Supp at 314, quoting Sbelton v Tucker, 364 US 679 (1960).
186. Cohen, 883 F Supp at 1412 ("The concept of academic freedom, however, is more
clearly established in academic literature than it is in the courts .... Several courts have

noted that judicial application of this doctrine is far from clear ....While Supreme Court
cases contain strongly worded defenses of 'academic freedom,' their rhetoric is broader
than their holdings.").
187. Id at 1414.

188. Id at 1420 ("the College's interest in effectively educating its students outweighs
Cohen's interest in focusing on sexual topics in the classroom, to the extent that the
university only requires Cohen to warn potential students of his teaching style and
topics").
189. Id at 1422 ("the Court notes that this ruling goes only to the narrow and
reasonable discipline which the College seeks to impose. A case in which a professor is

terminated or directly censored presents a far different balancing question").
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2. Students' Autonomy Interests
While the extent to which it influenced the court's outcome is unclear, the
Silva court at least mentioned the importance of academic freedom to the
autonomy of students. According to the court, "[tjeachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die." 9 ' Although clearly acknowledging the impact on academic freedom of regulating
sexual harassment, the Silva court completely ignored the impact that sexual
harassment itself has on the academic freedom of students who, for example, do
not attend class out of a fear of being harassed.
The Cohen court similarly recognized student's academic freedom interest in
an educational marketplace of ideas that is not dictated by the wishes of "the
most sensitive and the most easily offended students." 9' "Colleges and universities, as well as the courts, must avoid a tyranny of mediocrity, in which all discourse is made bland enough to suit the tastes of all students."' 92 The court
even explicitly recognized the educational value that difficult and undesirable
ideas may have: "Good teaching should challenge students and at times may intimidate students and make them uncomfortable." 93
However, the court erroneously believed that Cohen's duty to warn students
about his teaching did not compromise the students' academic freedom. In fact,
the Cohen court's explanation for its support of this remedy was even phrased
in terms that reflect autonomy concerns. According to the court, "[iun essence,
the College is requiring Cohen to warn students of his teaching style and topics
so that those students for whom this approach is ineffective may make an informed choice as to their educations." ' While this at least temporarily increased student autonomy, the court failed to grasp that promoting the autonomous choice of students in this way may harm autonomy, if Cohen's duty to
warn effectively decreases enrollment to the point that his ideas are removed
from the university marketplace.
Both courts also neglect the fact that the autonomy of those students who
are not the direct victims of sexual harassment is nevertheless endangered by
sexual harassment in the university classroom. For example, one can imagine a

university in which sexual harassment became so pervasive that female students
decided to study elsewhere. Then, the marketplace of ideas available to the
remaining male students could become devoid of the female viewpoint or, at
least, the ideas and opinions generated by this lost segment of the population. At
the same time, students, both male and female, also have an autonomy interest
in studying sexist ideas. This raises the difficulty of distinguishing between the

190. Silva, 888 F Supp at 314 (emphasis added), citing Keyshian v Board of Regents,
385 US at 589, 603 (1967).
191. Cohen, 883 F Supp at 1419.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id at 1420 (emphasis added).
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expression of sexist ideas in the clasgroom as part of an academic discoursethat
promotes autonomy and the sexual harassment of students that hinders autono19s
my.
All students have an interest in the equal respect of other students' autonomy. When we tolerate the abridgment of women's autonomy caused by sexual
harassment, neither men nor the unaffected women can rest assured that their
autonomy will not be similarly abridged. A culture that tolerates disrespect for
anyone's autonomy is more likely to tolerate the disrespect of everyone's autonomy. Inequality, representing a judgment that one group's autonomous capacities
are less developed or less worthy of respect, threatens the autonomy of everyone.
3. The Autonomy Rights of Female Victims
Although harm to the female victims of sexual harassment is plainly reported
in their opinions, neither court accounts for the autonomy-based harms of sexual
harassment in their legal analysis. The academic freedom, equality, and autonomy rights of the victims of Silva's sexual harassment are completely excluded
from the Silva court's analysis. The court's limited discussion of the impact of
Silva's speech belittled the victims by stating that the university took action
against Silva simply because "students found [Silva's] choice of words to be outrageous." 9 ' To add insult to injury, the court asserted that the six women who
were "offended" by Silva's belly dancing metaphor were "under the mistaken
impression that the word 'vibrator' necessarily connotes a sexual device" or that
this "misunderstanding" induced the women to regard the focus statement, using
extended references to sexual intercourse, as "part of an offensive academic
environment.""5 7 Such statements demonstrate the court's complete failure to
comprehend the harm caused by Silva's speech.
Silva's speech prompted six reasonable adult women to complain that the
environment in Silva's classroom was hostile to their ability to learn technical
writing and thereby denied them the equal opportunity to a quality education
(which is guaranteed to them' and for which they pay tuition). Rather than
being upset by the "outrageousness" of Silva's speech, students were scared,
"shocked," "demeaned," and "embarrassed." 9 One student described "a fear
of going to speak to [Silva] directly because they would never wish to be alone
with him." 2' Another student stated that Silva's speech constituted "'powerful,
aggressive, physical intimidation tactics which made [her] very uncomfortable. ' "' O' Thus, although the Silva court recounted the students' testimony as
to the harms they suffered as part of the university's hearing record, the court

195. See Part W.C. for one attempt to make this distinction.
196. Silva, 888 F Supp at 313.
197. Id.
198. See note 118.
199. Silva, 888 F Supp at 300.
200. Id.
201. Id at 302.
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simply ignored these harms in its own analysis without directly discrediting the
witnesses or their testimony.
On the other hand, the Cohen court was especially cognizant of the scope of
harm suffered by sexual harassment victims. The court noted that one student
was "offended by Cohen's repeated focus on topics of a sexual nature, his use of
profanity and vulgarities, and by his comments which she believed were directed
intentionally at her and some other female students in a humiliating and harassing manner."2" 2 The court even acknowledged the detrimental effect of such
harassment on the academic opportunities and success of its victims.20 3 Despite
such attention to harm, the Coben court's analysis placed the weight of these
harms within the university's interest in promoting educational equality. Instead,
the court should have respected the student victims as having cognizable interests, separate from and in addition to the university's interests.
4. The University's Autonomy Interests
As both Silva and Cohen engaged in some form of balancing between the
professor's interests and the university's interests, it is uninteresting that these
courts at least acknowledged that the university had interests. What is interesting
is how the courts defined the scope of the university's interests. In Silva, the
court characterized the university's interest so narrowly, as an interest in "providing a congenial academic environment," 2" that the university's interests
were disregarded as almost non-existent. Unsurprisingly, the court accordingly
found "Silva's First Amendment interest in the speech at issue [to be] overwhelmingly superior to UNH's interest in proscribing said speech.""' While perhaps
one aim of the university's sexual harassment policy, promoting a "congenial"
classroom environment is hardly a sufficient justification for a sexual harassment
policy, it is unlikely that this is the only interest the university had in mind.
Rather, like society at large, the university has an interest in protecting the
academic freedom, equality, and autonomy of all of its students, including those
who may be exposed to a sexually hostile academic environment. These interests
are especially compelling in light of the fact that the university's federal funding
is tied to its compliance with Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination in
education." 6
On the other hand, the Cohen court was perhaps overly deferential to the
autonomy of the university and "the college's mission of effectively educating its
students."2"7 According to the court, the university's educational mission encompasses an interest in preventing the disruption of classes, an interest in

202. Cohen, 883 F Supp at 1410.
203. Id (noting that Cohen's victims stopped attending class and that one victim even
received a failing grade for the semester).
204. Silva, 888 F Supp at 313.
205. Id at 316.
206. See notes 118 and 129.
207. Cohen, 883 F Supp at 1410.
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promoting the best teaching for all students, and an interest in preserving the
equality rights of its students.
Relying on the university's evidence and testimony of other teachers, the
Cohen court acknowledged that Cohen's sexual harassment caused disruptior'
that interfered with the university's education of its students. The court noted
that substantial, uncontroverted evidence showed that
the educational process was disrupted by Cohen's focus on sexual topics
and teaching style. There is testimony from the complaining student and
from other students in the class that Cohen's sexually suggestive remarks,,
use of vulgarities and obscenities, and the topics for discussion prevented
them from learning." 8
The court also agreed that, contrary to the university's interests, the hostile
environment created by Cohen's speech did not promote the best teaching.
Cohen's speech "impede[d] academic success for some students" and "did not
foster discussion by students but instead 'require[d] self-censorship rather than
complex analysis of an important issue,'" 20 9 according to the court.
Lastly, recognizing that the university's interest in promoting equal education
for all students, regardless of sex, has "constitutional implications"2 1 0 in addition to any statutory implications created by Title IX, the court concluded
"[u]iversities must be able to ensure that the more vulnerable as well as the
more sophisticated students receive a suitable education."21 ' However, future
courts must consider whether a "suitable education" is provided when universities "dumb down" their classes, teaching to the lowest common denominator,
thereby allowing their classrooms to be characterized by a "pall of orthodoxy."
5. Society's Autonomy Interests
When sexual harassment in the university classroom threatens the academic
freedom and equality of professors and students, society's strong interest in
autonomy is also imperiled. Universities defined by academic freedom "form
important parts of a system of ideas and institutions that creates a culture of
individual intellectual responsibility and that protects [society] from disintegrating into a culture of intellectual conformity."212 If today we allow our universities to suffer under a "pall of orthodoxy," tomorrow's fight against the tyranny
of the majority will become more likely and more difficult. Consequently, it is in
society's best interests to promote the conditions that best safeguard autonomy,
including equality, mental capacities, adequate options, and a culture of indepen208. Id at 1418.
209. Id at 1419.
210. Id at 1420.
211. Id.
212. Dworkin, New Interpretationat 185 (cited in note 4). Society should be concerned
with the health of the university "not just as a wise environment for academic discovery,

but as encouragement of and protection for the primacy of individual conviction." Id at
187-88.
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dence. These prerequisites to the full exercise of autonomy "concern a central
aspect of the whole system of values of a society, which affects its general
character."2 13 If we want our society to be characterized by freedom and
independence, courts must be vigilant to ensure that our universities exemplify
and safeguard our commitment to the autonomy of all individuals.
C. A FRAMEWORK FOR STRIKING THE BALANCE IN FUTURE CASES
An autonomy-driven balancing test demands a very situation-specific analysis, but does not leave courts without guidance. Courts must identify the full
scope of relevant interests including professors' autonomy interests, the autonomy interests of all students, the autonomy interests of female victims, the
university's autonomy interests, and society's autonomy interests. Having
identified the relevant interests, courts will find that most cases, despite their
often wildly unique details, will settle within an identifiable spectrum.
First, there will be some cases where the harm to autonomy from suppression will be slight compared to the harm to female students caused by a sexually
hostile learning environment. In these cases, equality concerns will prevail and
the speech may be suppressed or the speaker disciplined, not because equality is
more important, but because academic freedom values are not invoked. Take the
case of a university calculus professor who uses sexually charged vocabulary and
innuendo during his lectures, perhaps referring to female students with sexual
terms or using sexual imagery to describe sine curves or other graphs. Here, the
allegedly hostile speech has no tenable connection to the academic project. The
speech is outside the relevant subject area and outside any norm of academic discourse. Neither the pursuit of math truths, the proliferation of knowledge about
calculus, nor the mental capacities that are necessary to learn calculus will be
hindered by suppression. As a result, neither the professor, the students, nor
society has a strong autonomy interest in this speech. On the other hand, the
harm to the autonomy of female students is significant and the university's
interest in protecting these students and preventing the inevitable disruption to
its educational mission is strong.
Second, there will be some cases where the harm to autonomy from suppression will clearly outweigh any harms caused by the allegedly sexually hostile
educational environment. Take the case of a political science professor who disparages feminism and argues that it is women's duty to remain at home, care for
their husbands, and raise children. Although these ideas may cause upset, distract
female students from the study of political science, and make female students feel
unwelcome in the classroom, such harms do not create a strong autonomy-based
claim for suppression. Women do not have an autonomy right to be shielded
from ideas with which they disagree just because those ideas are related to
gender issues. While a responsible university may wish to counsel such a professor that open advocacy of such views may detract from the professor's other

213. Raz, The Morality of Freedom at 394 (cited in note 47).
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educational goals, the university may do so without suppressing speech. 14 The:
university simply does not have an interest in suppressing speech that it disagrees
with politically or that reflects values contrary to its own.
Instead, the university's relevant autonomy interests counsel in favor of
protecting such speech under the umbrella of academic freedom. The politica[&
science professor's ideas are solidly within the bounds of the academic project in
a political science course and are conveyed in a manner that comports with
acadernic discourse, as understood in light of education's role in promoting the
prerequisites for individual autonomy. As a result, suppression of this speech
would significantly impair the autonomy values fostered by academic freedom."
Suppression would have a severe chilling effect on the speech of both professors
Society's1
and students and would remove valuable ideas from the marketplace.
autonomy interests mirror those of the students and professors and include anC'
interest in preserving such discourse for its contribution to democracy and a"
culture of independence.
Finally, the result in many cases will be less clear However, some of the
factors that will push these borderline cases one way or the other can be identified. Take the case of an English professor who makes sexual comments while
teaching a work of literature with strong sexual themes, perhaps Ulysses by
James Joyce. Like the political science discussion of feminism, discussion of
sexual themes in modem literature is a legitimate focus for literary study and
expands the academic inquiry. Thus, we should be concerned that the suppression of sexual discourse in an English class will severely chill the speech of both
the professor and the students. Such a chilling effect may remove one way of
understanding literature from the marketplace and may corrupt the "truth" of
the students' reading of the book.
Moreover, female students do not have an autonomy interest in cutting
themselves off from all discussion of sexuality and should be suspicious of any
official attempt to determine which types of sexuality are hostile to women and
which types are not. Although society's interests are arguably less strong here
than in cases where the speech is more explicitly political, society should discourage any suppression of ideas. Lastly, while the university has an interest in
minimizing disruption in its classrooms and protecting its students from harassment, given the relative weakness of the autonomy claims of the alleged victims
of the harassment, the university's interest in preserving an unfettered academic
marketplace should prevail.
On the other hand, when the female students' autonomy interests are more
directly invaded, some of these borderline cases will tip towards finding the
speech at issue unprotected. For example, if the English professor decides to
discuss the sexual themes in Ulysses in a manner that departs from the norms of

214. As demonstrated by the potential chilling effect and harm to autonomy from the
university's requirement that Cohen warn students about his teaching style and offensive
topics, there is a slippery slope here. A university that chooses this path should proceed
with caution.
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civil, academic discourse, the balance may shift. Perhaps in comparing Ulysses to
contemporary depictions of sexuality, the English professor reads graphic,
sexually-violent descriptions of sex or forces students to view pornography.
Then, the manner of the speech at issue would be detached from the norms of
academic discourse, and suppression of that particular method of expression
would not remove all discussion of sexual themes in Ulysses from the academic
marketplace. Consequently, university professors' classroom speech that is on the
borderline may be unprotected if it is sexually explicit.
Ultimately, the outcome in these borderline cases must depend upon the
particular facts in any given case. While this decision does involve an unavoidable element of discretion, the result in borderline cases must be driven by, or at
the very least account fo4 autonomy concerns. Viewing sexually hostile educational environment claims through an autonomy lens helps to highlight the full
range of interests at stake and the way in which these interests are interrelated.
Focusing on autonomy should remove the blinders present in Silva and Cohen
and help future courts avoid the same mistakes. Future courts must understand
that these cases do not represent a conflict between academic freedom and
equality, but merely a set of trade-offs between interdependent autonomy
interests.
V. Conclusion
While there is no easy answer to the problem of professors' classroom speech
that creates a sexually hostile educational environment, the courts must do
better. Hostile environment sexual harassment in the university classroom must
be understood as posing more than simply a choice between equality rights and
academic freedom rights. The alleged conflict between academic freedom and
equality must be recognized for what it is-a complex web of intersecting and
interdependent autonomy rights of students, professors, and society. Then, courts
must be willing to embrace the difficult task of engaging with a robust understanding of autonomy in order to formulate a remedy for sexual harassment in
the university classroom that will best foster the autonomy of all individuals
215
concerned.

215. Most of the ideas developed in this Comment could also equally apply to classroom speech that creates a racially hostile learning environment.

